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Tenants Without Rights: Situating the Experiences
of New Immigrants in the U.S. Low-Income Housing
Market
Mekonnen Firew Ayano*
Immigrants who recently arrived in the United States generally are not
able to exclusively possess rental properties in the formal market because
they lack a steady source of income and credit history. Instead, they rent
shared bedrooms, basements, attics, garages, and illegally converted units
that violate housing codes and regulations. Their situations highlight the
disconnect between tenant rights law and the deleterious conditions of
informal residential tenancies. Tenant rights law confers a variety of
rights and remedies to a residential tenant if the renter has exclusive
possession of the premises. If the renter lacks exclusive possession, courts
typically characterize the occupancy as a license, treating the renter as a
transient occupant with contractual rights and remedies. Situating the
experiences of new immigrants within the low-income housing
affordability crisis, this Article proposes that courts should steer away
from considering tenant status and its associated rights and remedies as a
function of exclusive control of the premises. Instead, they should enforce
informal tenants’ legitimate interests, impose duties on those who rent out
substandard units, and award damages when the rent paid is
disproportionately high relative to the condition of the premises.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Saman, 1 an East African immigrant who came to the United States (U.S.)
about a decade ago through the Diversity Visa Program, 2 lives with his three
children, spouse, and mother-in-law in a Virginia county, in the basement of a
single-family home. The basement has no kitchen or other facilities, but he has
creatively customized a kitchenette, a bathroom, and a workstation for his artwork.
Sebr,3 another East African immigrant, lives in the same house in a room next to
the homeowner's bedroom. They share a kitchen and a fridge. The homeowner
bought the house some years ago and relies partly on Saman's and Sebr’s rent for
his mortgage payment.4 Neither Saman nor Sebr have a written lease.5
1 . Interview with Saman Tashale, in Washington, D.C. (July 18, 2019) (on file with author).
[hereinafter Interview with Saman]. Names of interviewees are not real for privacy concerns.
2. The Diversity Visa Program is a random selection system that allows 50,000 immigrant visas
annually for individuals from countries with low immigration rates to apply for permanent residence in the
United States. For a discussion of the significance of this program for immigrants from African countries,
see Andowah A. Newton, Injecting Diversity into U.S. Immigration Policy and the Missing Discourse on
its Impact on African Immigrants to the United States, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1049 (2005).
3. Interview with Sebr Alemu, in Washington, D.C. (July 18, 2019) (on file with author). [hereinafter
Interview with Sebr].
4 . Interview with Tam Badhadha, in Washington, D.C. (July 18, 2019) (on file with author).
[hereinafter Interview with Tam].
5. In such arrangements the rents are paid in cash and the agreements are oral. Obtaining a written
lease agreement would be costly for the homeowner and of little use to the renters, given their lack of
language proficiency and the cost of legal services. See Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 791, 817–18 (1974).
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Such arrangements are hardly unique in the U.S. low-income housing market.
Studies show that a steadily increasing number of people are living in communal
arrangements—splitting apartments and sharing bedrooms—to cope with the lack
of affordable housing.6 Social inequality, stagnant wages, and rapidly increasing
rents have contributed to this situation.7 A household with two adults who work
full-time at minimum wage cannot rent a two-bedroom apartment in Washington,
DC.8 A full-time minimum-wage worker cannot afford a one-bedroom rental home
in most parts of the country. 9 Immigrants rarely find housing anywhere in the
formal market, not only because they lack an adequate and steady income source,
but also because they cannot produce a recorded credit history and confront various
restrictive laws and practices connected to their immigrant status.10 Instead, they
rely on their family, acquaintances, and other social networks to rent shared
bedrooms, basements, attics, garages, and illegally converted units that usually are
insecure and fraught with a variety of health and safety hazards.11 For many, living
in such an arrangement lasts years and may never end for some immigrants.
6. See Mallika Mitra, Forget Splitting an Apartment. These Renters Are Sharing Bedrooms, CNBC
(July 12, 2019 9:29AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/11/forget-sharing-an-apartment-renters-aresharing-rooms-to-save-money.html; Kevin Simpson, Colorado’s “Doubled-up” Households Have Surged Since
the Recession. That Could Prolong the Housing Crunch, COLO. SUN (Oct. 2, 2019 5:05 AM),
https://coloradosun.com/2019/10/02/colorado-doubled-up-households/; Richard Fry, More Adults Now Share
Their Living Space, Driven in Part by Parents Living with Their Adult Children, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/31/more-adults-now-share-their-living-space-driven-in-partby-parents-living-with-their-adult-children/; Laryssa Mykyta, Economic Downturns and the Failure to Launch:
The Living Arrangements of Young Adults in the U.S. 1995-2011 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 201224, 2012), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2012/demo/SEHSD-WP201224.pdf; see also Hope Harvey, Experiences of Doubling-Up Among American Families with Children (2018)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:39947157 (showing
that prevalence of shared home arrangements varies along racial lines) (“While slightly less than 20 percent
of white adults over age 25 live in doubled-up households, 36 percent of Hispanic adults, 32 percent of
Asian adults, and 31 percent of black adults live in doubled-up households.”).
7. See Whitney Airgood-Obrycki et al., The Rent Eats First: Rental Housing Unaffordability in the
US, Joint Center for Housing Studies, HARVARD UNIV. 3–4 (2021),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/research/files/harvard_jchs_rent_eats_first_airgoodobrycki_hermann_wedeen_2021.pdf.
8. Laurie Ball Cooper & Ana Vohryzek, Rethinking Rapid Re-Housing: Toward Sustainable Housing
for Homeless Populations, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 307, 308 (2016).
9. Alicia Adamczyk, Minimum Wage Workers Cannot Afford Rent in Any U.S. State, CNBC (July 14,
2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/14/minimum-wage-workers-cannot-afford-rent-in-any-usstate.html. While the national average fair market rent for a one-bedroom home in most parts of the US is
$1,017 per month and $1,246 for a two-bedroom home, a family of four with poverty-level income in the
country cannot afford monthly rent of more than $655. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH
2020 2 (2020), https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2020.pdf [hereinafter OUT OF REACH 2020].
10. See Daniel Edwardo Guzmán, There Be No Shelter Here: Anti-Immigrant Housing Ordinances &
Comprehensive Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 414–22 (2012); STEVEN BENDER, TIERRA Y
LIBERTAD: LAND, LIBERTY, AND LATINO HOUSING 73–93 (2010); Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Can New
Americans Achieve the American Dream? Promoting Homeownership in Immigrant Communities, 39
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 182–91 (2004) (discussing mortgage lending discrimination faced by
immigrants and variations among immigrants in the U.S. based on citizenship status, length of residence,
and country of origin).
11. Jill S. Litt et al., Housing Environments and Child Health Conditions Among Recent Mexican
Immigrant Families: A Population-Based Study, 12 J. IMMIGRANT & MINORITY HEALTH 617, 617 (2010);
Michael H. Schill et al., The Housing Conditions of Immigrants in New York City, 9 J. HOUS. RESEARCH
201, 226 (1998).
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Further, as a recent study shows, low-income renters pay exploitatively high rent
for substandard and even perilous properties because landlords capitalize on their
superior access to the law and market forces to extract above-market rents.12
Tenant rights law envisions a variety of rights and remedies for residential
tenants, including warranties of habitability, warranties of quiet enjoyment, and
other substantive and procedural rights that promote decent, safe, and secure rental
homes.13 Federal and state fair housing laws prohibit landlords, real estate agents,
and financiers from discriminating against renters because of race, color, religion,
sex, disability, familial status, or national origin.14 Some state and local laws have
expanded anti-discrimination laws to protect other social groups, such as domestic
violence survivors.15 However, these rights are available only for an occupant who
has exclusive possession of the premises.16 If a renter lacks exclusive possession,
which is the normal case in shared living arrangements among immigrants, courts
typically treat the arrangement as a license, which comes with contractual and
common law rights and remedies that are substantially fewer than tenant property
rights.17 Licensees’ rights are as good as the agreements and common law rules
unless a legislative vehicle grants them greater rights than those of licensees.18 This
means that renters residing in garages, lofts, basements, and illegally converted or
other non-compliant units can be evicted by regulators enforcing housing codes or
by the owner using self-help.19
Tenant rights law does not cover a recently arrived immigrant who rents a
basement room in a single-family neighborhood and gets evicted because she tests
positive for coronavirus (COVID-19). 20 An immigrant family that is denied
heating and cooling services in an unventilated basement has no legal recourse
under tenant rights law.21 An immigrant sharing the living room with an apartment
12. Matthew Desmond & Nathan Wilmers, Do the Poor Pay More for Housing? Exploitation, Profit,
and Risk in Rental Markets? 124 AM. J. SOCIO. 4, 1090, 1115 (2019).
13. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, 815–
17 (2017); MILTON FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES, WARRANTIES OF HABITABILITY § 10:3 (6th ed.,
2017); S. WILLISTON, Implied Conditions and Covenants in Leases—Quiet Enjoyment, in WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS, § 48:10 (4th ed. 2020).
14. 42 U.S.C.A. §3604 (WEST).
15. See e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580 (West 2014). But see Joseph J. Railey, Married on
Sunday, Evicted on Monday: Interpreting the Fair Housing Act's Prohibition of Discrimination "Because
of Sex" to Include Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 36 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 99, 120 (2019).
16. Lisa Cline, Property: Preoccupation with Occupancy: Defining "Residential Tenant" Under
Minnesota Statute Section 504b.375-Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 236, 239–
43 (2018); Michelle Maese, Rethinking "Host" & "Guest" Relations in the Advent of Airbnb & the Sharing
Economy, 2 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 481, 492–95 (2015).
17. 43A C.J.S. Inns, Hotels, and Eating Places § 8 (2021).
18. See Drost v. Hookey, 881 N.Y.S.2d 839, 844 (Dist. Ct. 2009).
19. A license can be revoked at the will of the licensor, and the licensor does not need a summary
removal proceeding to deny the licensee entry into the premises. See Kimack v. Adams, 930 S.W.2d 505,
507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Andrews v. Acacia Network, 70 N.Y.S.3d 744 (N.Y. App. Term 2018). Some
jurisdictions require ten-day notice to evict a lodger. See Drost, 881 N.Y.S.2d at 844; N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTS. LAW § 713 (McKinney).
20. See generally Conor Dougherty, Pandemics Toll on Housing: Falling Behind, Doubling Up, The
New York Times (Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/06/business/economy/housinginsecurity.html [hereinafter Pandemics Toll on Housing].
21. See generally Caitlin Dickerson, Sleeping Outside in a Pandemic: Vulnerable Renters Face
Evictions, The New York Times (Jul. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/04/us/coronavirusevictions-renters-immigrants.html
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renter can be locked out because he came home from work late at night; or, an
immigrant who rents a room from a tenant in public housing, not knowing that he
could not have his mail delivered to that address, has no remedy under tenant rights
law.22 Further, fair housing laws do not protect people in such situations because
these rules stop, as the Ninth Circuit recently declared, at “the front door” of a
single-family house or apartment.23
Commentators have casually observed that the divide between a tenant and a
licensee is anachronistic and fails to reflect housing realities in modern urban
settings.24 A 1955 Note in the Yale Law Journal argued that the permanence of
residence would be a better determinant of tenant status than exclusivity of
possession and proposed that long-term residents be entitled to the stability of
tenure, notice to quit, and other rights and remedies available under tenant rights
law. 25 The issue recently attracted new attention in legal academia due to the
steadily increasing number of renters who depend on shared or “communal living”
arrangements outside the standard landlord-tenant relationship.26 For example, a
recent article by Professor Shelly Kreiczer-Levy looks at informality in the U.S.
low-income housing markets through the lens of property law and shows that the
law does not confer legal rights on the steadily increasing number of American
adults who are sharing their parents’ home because of the rising scarcity and cost
of housing.27
This Article extends the research on informality in the housing market to the
situation of newly arrived immigrants. Drawing on sociological materials,
interviews, and discussions with immigrants from African countries in
Washington, D.C., from 2017 to 2020, this article shows the incapacity of tenant
rights law to address the deleterious conditions of recently arrived immigrants in
informal housing.28 The Article analyzes the precariousness of informal housing
arrangements and proposes that courts steer away from considering “tenant” status
and the associated rights and remedies as a function of exclusive control of the
premises. Instead, they should expand fundamental tenant rights and interests to
include renters occupying premises in an arrangement that does not fall under the
standard landlord-tenant relationships. Courts should do this by imposing duties
22. Id.
23. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th
Cir. 2012); see also Tim Iglesias, Does Fair Housing Law Apply to "Shared Living Situations"? Or the
Trouble With Roommates, 22 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 111, 112 (2014).
24. 3 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES, LEASES, LICENSES, AND EASEMENTS COMPARED § 37:3, at 13.
25. Tenant, Lodger, and Guest: Questionable Categories for Modern Rental Occupants, 64 YALE L.J.
391, 410 (1955).
26. France Svistovski, Burning Down the Housing Market: Communal Living in New York, 47
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 463, 470 (2020).
27. Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, The Informal Property Rights of Boomerang Children in the Home, 74
MD. L. REV. 127, 128–29 (2014).
28 . While legally admitted Ethiopian immigrants offer narrative evidence for my sources,
immigration status is immaterial to determine tenant rights. At least according to Third Circuit (Lozano v.
City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 314–22 (3d Cir. 2013)) and Fifth Circuit (Villas at Parkside Partners v.
City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 726 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 2013)) jurisprudence, alienage is no longer a
ground for state and local governments to confer disparate property rights and remedies among citizens,
documents immigrants, and undocumented immigrants. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard
Place: Landlords, Latinos, and Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62
VAND. L. REV. 53, 55–125 (2009).
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on property owners to take account of the legitimate interests of all occupants
meeting the criteria of “informal tenants.”
The term “informal tenant” is used here to describe a renter sheltered in a
twilight zone of legality, outside the standard landlord-tenant relationship. The
Article argues that informal tenants should have a legal right not to be evicted
without adequate notice, the right to have adequate heating and cooling services,
and other rights and remedies necessary for safe and secure housing. They should
also have the right to damages when they are charged a disproportionately high
rent compared to the condition of the housing. As informal tenancies have become
ubiquitous, tenant rights law, which envisions landlord-tenant relationships
narrowly and thereby renders the experiences of informal tenants legally invisible,
needs to be adjusted to mitigate the precariousness of informal housing. Even
during the COVID-19 pandemic, when federal and local laws have imposed a
moratorium on evictions and provided other temporary relief to mitigate the impact
of the pandemic, informal tenants are not covered by the legal safeguards which
cover only formal tenants as defined by property law. 29 Part II discusses
tenant/licensee distinctions and demonstrates the narrow interpretation of
residential tenants in tenant rights law. Part III reviews informal housing and
factors driving informality in low-income households due to the current scarcity
of affordable, safe, and secure housing, while Part IV zeroes in on the conditions
that exacerbate these challenges for immigrants. Part V shows that while
immigrants’ experiences broadly reflect the experiences of low-income social
segments in the housing market, immigrants face unique challenges because of
their triple status as renters, as immigrants, and (frequently) as members of racial
minorities. Part VI argues that courts should recognize fundamental rights and
legitimate expectations, such as the right not to be evicted without adequate notice
and the right to damages for substandard housing, particularly when the informal
tenant has been evicted without a reasonably adequate notice or paid a
disproportionately high rent relative to the market value or condition of the
property. The Article concludes by emphasizing the disharmonies between tenant
rights law and the social realities of informal housing, and the need for serious
attention to tenants' conditions and rights in informal housing arrangements.
II. TENANTS AND TENANT RIGHTS
Modern tenant rights law is extensive and provides substantial protections;
however, its reach is circumscribed by the law’s narrow definition of the term
“tenant” in the landlord-tenant relationship. In each tenants’ rights case, the court
must determine whether the landlord-tenant relationship exists based on elaborate
criteria. The criteria includes: (a) whether the landlord has transferred absolute
control and possession of a designated space to the tenant subject to rights
specifically reserved to the owner and (b) whether the landlord and tenant have
agreed to create an estate in the tenant either for a specified period that is less than

29. See Dickerson, supra note 21. See also Andrea Palumbo & Karmen McQuitty, Tenant Rights in the
Era of Covid-19, 77 BENCH & B. MINN. 36 (2020); Michael Allan Wolf, COVID-19 Pandemic and Real
Property Law: An Early Assessment of Relief Measures for Tenants and Residential Mortgagors, POWELL
ON REAL PROP. (2020).
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that which the landlord holds or a term that can be terminated at their will. 30
Although the technical language or characterization used in the rental agreement
is not dispositive, exclusive possession of the premises is the "principal test” used
to determine whether the relationship created between parties is that of landlord
and tenant rather than of licensor and licensee.31 This possession-centered, narrow
conception of tenant status denies informal tenants the rights and remedies
conferred by tenant rights law. The next section further discusses the
tenant/licensee distinction, explaining why licensees have substantially fewer
rights and remedies than tenants.
A. Tenant Rights as a Special Legal Category
When the tenant lacks exclusive possession of the premises, courts
typically treat the relationship as a license.32 A license is a contractual "authority
to do a particular act, or series of acts, upon another's land without possessing an
estate therein."33 This legal category is traditionally applied to "[k]insfolk ‘who are
provided with board and the confines of a home’" and "non children real property
occupants who are not on the deed or lease of real property," 34 lodgers, 35 and
people renting individual rooms.36 In urban settings today, license arrangements
cover not only traditional transient lodgers and boarders, but also roommates not
included in the lease, superintendents who are given dwelling places as part of their
employment, students living in university or college dormitories, farmworkers
housed by their employers, and many other dwelling arrangements that do not fall
under the standard tenant-landlord relationship with exclusive possession of the
premises.37
30. See Am. Jewish Theatre, Inc. v. Roundabout Theatre Co., Inc., 610 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994); Santa Fe Trail Neighborhood Redevelopment Corp. v. W.F. Coen & Co., 154 S.W.3d 432, 440
(Mo. Ct. App. 2005). Despite some variations across states and exceptions within each state law, a lease
agreement must be in writing, and long-term leases must be acknowledged and in a deed form. WILLIAM
B. STOEBUCK & JOHN W. WEAVER, 17 WASH. PRAC., REAL ESTATE § 6.10 (2d ed. 2020).
31. Characteristic of exclusive possession and control of the premises is the fundamental criterion in
distinguishing between a tenant and a guest. Ann Arbor Tenants Union v. Ann Arbor YMCA, 581 N.W.2d
794, 800 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
32. Matthew R. Hays, Crusading for the Helpless or Biting the Hand That Feeds? Applying LandlordTenant Law to Residents in Shelters, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 445–48 (2007).
33. Moore v. Stetson, 52 A. 767, 769 (Me. 1902).
34. People v. Hyland, 862 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Dist. Ct. 2008) (quoting Mathews v. Mathews, 2 N.Y.S.
121 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1888)).
35. City of Worcester v. Coll. Hill Properties, LLC, 987 N.E.2d 1236, 1241–46 (Mass. 2013).
36. Ashton v. Margolies, 129 N.Y.S. 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911).
37. New York law, for instance, defines a lodger “as a person who contracts for less than a landlord /
tenant relationship” whereby the lodger has “unexclusive occupancy of real property” and the owner retains
“dominion over the premises.” Hyland, 862 N.Y.S.2d at 816. Massachusetts law defines lodging as “a
house where lodgings are let to four or more persons not within the second degree of kindred to the person
conducting it, and shall include fraternity houses and dormitories of educational institutions, but shall not
include dormitories of charitable or philanthropic institutions or convalescent or nursing homes licensed
under section seventy-one of chapter one hundred and eleven or rest homes so licensed, or group residences
licensed or regulated by agencies of the commonwealth.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 140, § 22 (West,
2021). Courts have extended tenant rights to occupants of dwelling units as permanent residence even when
the agreement characterized the arrangement as “lodging” exempted from tenant rights law. See Thomas
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In characterizing a living arrangement as a license, courts consider numerous
factors that include whether the owner retained keys to the premises; lived on the
same premises as the occupant; posted a doorman or desk clerk; provided meals,
utilities, cleaning services, towels, linens, utensils, and furnishings; or held the
premises out to the public as a place for travelers or lodgers.38 If these factors are
present, the duration of the arrangement has "a heightened importance," because
courts generally consider a short residence period, even with exclusive possession
of the premises, as an indicator of a license arrangement rather than a lease.39 Thus,
a person renting a vacation home for a short period of time is a licensee, even
though the renter has exclusive possession of the premises for the period.40
Tenant status as a legal category evolved in an agrarian economy, when it was
not only assumed that “the land was the most important feature of the conveyance,”
but also that the landlord and tenant had equal bargaining power.41 Traditional
landlords had no obligation to the tenant for the condition, quality, and habitability
of the premises.42 Agrarian renters took the land as they found it, bearing all risks
associated with the property in accordance with the caveat emptor rule, which
shifted “the responsibility of examining as to the existence of defects in the
premises and of providing against their ill effects” to the tenant. 43 The rules
absolved landlords from all responsibilities for defective conditions and also from
having to repair the premises, unless they contractually agreed to assume the
responsibility.44 Even when a landlord agreed to assume the responsibility for the
condition, quality, and habitability of the premises, a tenant had no right to
withhold the rent when the landlord failed to fulfill that obligation.45
While the doctrine of exclusive possession remains a key element in whether
courts characterize a dwelling arrangement as conferring tenancy rights, the
traditional doctrines governing tenant rights have changed in many ways. Modern
courts and lawmakers considered the prevalence of asymmetric bargains between
tenants and landlords in residential tenancies, professional specializations in
modern economies, and the interdependency of life in modern urban settings and

v. Lenhart, 444 A.2d 246, 248 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to protection
under landlord and tenant statutes because the rental agreement described the parties as ‘lodger’ and
‘lodging housekeeper’ to avoid the application of landlord and tenant statutes).
38. Benham v. Morton & Furbish Agency, 929 A.2d 471, 475 (Me. 2007).
39. Benham, 929 A.2d at 475.
40. Id. at 475–76.
41. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
42. ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1:1, at 2 (1980).
43. Conradi v. Arnold, 209 P.2d 491, 498–99 (Wash. 1949) (citing 32 AM JUR. Landlord and Tenant
§ 654, at 515).
44. SCHOSHINISKI, supra note 42, at 2.
45. Conradi, 209 P.2d at 498 (citing 32 AM JUR. Landlord and Tenant § 654, at 515 (“A lessee takes
the hired premises, in the absence of warranty, fraud, or misrepresentation, in the condition and quality in
which they are. The tenant takes the property as he finds is it, with all existing defects which he knows or
can ascertain by reasonable inspection. He takes the risk of apparent defects. As between himself and his
landlord, where there is no fraud or false representation or deceit, and in the absence of an express warranty
or covenant to repair, there is no implied contract that the premises are suitable or fit for the occupation, or
for the particular use intended, or that they are safe for use. Any implied contract relates only to the estate,
and not to the condition, of the property.”)
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rejected the caveat emptor rule.46 For instance, the Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp.
court stated that:
The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal
property law, that a lease primarily conveyed to the tenant an
interest in land may have been reasonable in a rural, agrarian
society; it may continue to be reasonable in some leases involving
farming or commercial land. In these cases, the value of the lease
to the tenant is the land itself. But in the case of the modern
apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it gives him a place
to live. The city dweller who seeks to lease an apartment on the
third floor of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet
below, or even in the bare right to possession within the four walls
of his apartment. When American city dwellers, both rich and
poor, seek ‘shelter’ today, they seek a well known package of
goods and services — a package which includes not merely walls
and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation,
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper
sanitation, and proper maintenance.47
Tenants today possess nearly all the rights and privileges one can have over
one’s property for the duration of the lease, such as warranties of quiet enjoyment
and habitability,48 protections against evictions,49 and nondiscrimination in the real
estate markets.50 For instance, a tenant can sue for nuisance or trespass in her own
name;51 she can have guests;52 she can sublet the property to others;53 she can seek
compensation if the property is condemned.54
The legal consequences of categorizing an occupant’s status as that of a tenant
entail substantially different common law rights and remedies than are available to
a licensee. A leading treatise on the subject summarizes the different rights and
remedies attaching to tenants and licensees as follows:
A lodger is not entitled to the notice to quit that is the right of the
tenant. The lodger may not bring any possessory action, as may a
tenant. A lodger is not liable for rent but may be liable for breach
of contract. This being so, a landlord who sues a lodger for
46. See generally SCHOSHINISKI, supra note 42, at 3.
47. Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
48. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. App. 1973) (“In every residential lease there [is] an
implied warranty by the landlord that the dwelling is habitable and fit for living at the inception of the term
and that it will remain so during the entire term. The warranty of the landlord is that he will provide facilities
and services vital to the life, health and safety of the tenant and to the use of the premises for residential
purposes. It is an obligation which the landlord fulfills by substantial compliance with the relevant
provisions of an applicable housing code.”).
49. See COLLEEN K. SANSON, 44 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 447, Westlaw (2010).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 (West).
51. 12 A.L.R.2d 1192 (Originally published in 1950).
52. 30 No. 9 Quinlan, Landlord Tenant Law Bulletin art. 7.
53. 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 31.
54. Thomas W. Merrill, Daniel Unumb & Victor P. Goldberg, Bargaining in the Shadow Eminent
Domain: Valuing & Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord & Tenant, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 1083, 1086–87 (1987); EDWARD D. MCKIRDY, LANDLORD-TENANT PROBLEMS 145, Westlaw
(1994).
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payment must seek to minimize his damages. Though traditionally
a landlord was not liable to a tenant for repairs, he is so liable to a
lodger.55
In some instances, a licensee is afforded better legal protections than a tenant
for injuries caused by the defective condition of the premises. While a hotel or
innkeeper owes its guests a duty of reasonable care and is responsible for injuries
caused by conditions of the property, the landlord is not responsible for injuries
caused by defective conditions in areas within the tenant's exclusive control.56
However, some state statutes give tenants who are injured by substandard housing
conditions the right to withhold rent or claim other legal remedies.57
The tenant/licensee distinction raises important questions about the legal
position of informal tenants. Does it reflect or adequately respond to the current
social reality in the country’s housing market whereby a steadily growing number
of people live in shared rental arrangements? Does the legal concept of tenant as a
renter with exclusive possession of a definite place apply to renters in shared,
informal housing? The next part considers the nature of informal housing and
factors driving informality in the low-income housing market. Subsequent parts
consider these questions more closely, discussing the extent and experiences of
immigrants in informal housing.
III. INFORMAL HOUSING
This part reviews informal housing and explains how the combined effects of
stagnant wages, steadily rising rent, and restrictive laws and practices foster
informal housing in the low-income housing market. Informal housing is often
considered a feature of the Global South.58 Scholarship on informal housing in the
U.S. has evolved beginning in the 1970s, when colonias – informal settlements by
largely Hispanic communities who built houses on untitled parcels along the U.S.Mexico border without official permits, plans, and municipal services,–gained
attention in the academia and policymaking scenes.59 At first the phenomenon was
55. 3 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES, LEASES, LICENSES, AND EASEMENTS COMPARED § 37:3, at 11–12 (6th
ed. 2017).
56. See, e.g., Benham v. Morton & Furbish Agency, 929 A.2d 471, 474 (Me. 2007). Under common
law, owners owe fewer duties to trespassers and licensees than they owe to guests and other invitees; Cause
of Action Against Hotel or Motel for Failure to Provide Guests With Safe Accommodations, in CAUSES OF
ACTION § 10 (2021). Matthew D. Lincoln, Landowners' Duty to Guests of Invitees & Tenants: Vogt v.
Murraywood Swim & Racquet Club and Goode v. St. Stephens United Methodist Church, 57 S.C.L. REV.
387, 388–95 (2005).
57. 1 TIFFANY REAL PROP., LIABILITY OF LESSOR FOR INJURIES TO LICENSEES, INVITEES, § 107 (3d
ed. 2020); Melissa T. Lonegrass, Convergence in Contort: Landlord Liability for Defective Premises in
Comparative Perspective, 85 TUL. L. REV. 413, 425 (2010).
58. See Vinit Mukhija & Anstasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Introduction to THE INFORMAL AMERICAN
CITY: BEYOND TACO TRUCKS AND DAY LABOR 1–17 (Vinit Mukhija & Anstasia Loukaitou-Sideris eds.,
2014). Because it is closely associated to urban slums in the Global South, informal housing signifies
squatting, untitled properties, and unplanned and crowded shanties without permits and infrastructure that
belie the image of urban life in the popular imaginations of rich economies. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME (UN-HABITAT), THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS 2003, at 6 (2003).
59. See Noah J. Durst, Informal and Ubiquitous: Colonias, Premature Subdivisions and Other
Unplanned Suburbs on America’s Urban Fringe, 56 URB. STUD. 722, 723-725 (2018).
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dismissed by policymakers and scholars as a replication of immigrants’
experiences from their home countries. 60 More recent scholarship, however,
rejects this view and the underlying assumption that informality is antithetical to
the laws and functioning of developed capitalist economies like the U.S. 61
Professor Duncan Kennedy noted that “[w]ith respect to the dimensions of
legality/illegality and formal/informal normative ordering, the Unitedstatesean
market is much more like typical third world metro regional markets than we
United States analysts generally recognize.”62 Similarly, the late Professor Jane
Larson argued not only that rich and democratic countries that dominate the world
economy and politics have failed to house their poor, but also that informality is
inherent in neoliberal economies, stating: “The colonias are a structural response
to the globalization of the U.S. economy, and its parallel effects of diminishing
wages for labor and discouraging public investment in both housing and income
maintenance. As such, there is nothing either temporary or aberrational about this
housing pattern.”63
Sociologist Saskia Sassen situates informal housing within a broader sphere of
“income-generating activities occurring outside the state's regulatory framework
that have analogs within that framework.”64 Such activities include sweatshops
that work in the shadow of labor law and regulations,65 or street vending in New
York City that operates in the shadow of trade licensing and regulations.66 Like
these other activities and practices, informal housing emerges and evolves in
response to opportunities created and constraints imposed by formal laws and
markets. Informal housing exists as a survival strategy adopted in response to
intrinsic inequities and fault lines of neoliberal economic structures rather than the
result of immigration or other extrinsic factors, and the logic of informality applies
to those who strategically evade formal laws to maximize profit and wealth, as
well as to those who resort to informal ordering as a survival strategy. In Texas,
for instance, domestic rather than Mexican real estate developers drove the
creation of colonias by exploiting laws that created opportunities to build and sell
untitled, subdivided units. 67 Women, immigrants, people of color, and other
vulnerable social segments depend on informality as a survival strategy because
the formal law and economy have excluded them.68 Immigrants’ experience is only
a specific instance of renters’ experience in the U.S. low-income housing market.
60. Jake Wegmann & Sarah Mawhorter, Measuring Informal Housing Production in California
Cities, 83 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 119, 121 (2017).
61. Hernando de Soto popularized the view that irrational laws and policies in developing economies
drive informality. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 1–14 (2000).
62 . Duncan Kennedy, Legal Economics of U.S. Low Income Housing Markets in Light of
"Informality" Analysis, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 71, 81 (2002).
63. Jane E. Larson, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 155 (2002).
64. Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old Regulations, 103
YALE L.J. 2289, 2289 (1994).
65. Id. at 2292.
66. See generally Ryan Thomas Devlin, An Area that Governs Itself: Informality, Uncertainty, and
the Management of Street Vending in New York City, 10 PLAN. THEORY 53 (2011).
67. Wegmann & Mawhorter, supra note 60, at 121.
68. Larson, supra note 63, at 141. See also Eric Sheppard, Tony Sparks, & Helga Leitner, World
Class Aspirations, Urban Informality, and Poverty Politics: A North–South Comparison, 52 ANTIPODE
393, 394–95 (2020); Regina Austin, “An Honest Living”: Street Venders, Municipal Regulations, and the
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Research in the fields of urban planning and sociology shows that informal
housing in the U.S. is ubiquitous. Professors Noah J. Durst and Jake Wegmann
show that housing units flouting planning and zoning codes, parcels lacking titles
or permits, rentals lacking required formalities, and dwelling arrangements that
violate occupancy and other standards pervade both urban and suburban locales
across the U.S.69 A 2008 survey conducted in New York City found that between
1990 and 2000, approximately 114,000 apartments were not reflected in the
official number of certificates of occupancy the city granted for new construction
or renovation. 70 It also indicated that after 2000, many more such “phantom
apartments” were created. 71 These included private homes cut into rooming
houses, two-family homes with unauthorized basement apartments housing a third
family, and commercial lofts converted to residential property without regulatory
approval.72
In some locales race and immigration shaped the legal and political conditions
surrounding the development of informal housing. In Los Angeles, for instance,
informal housing “began as an auspicious opportunity for working-class whites in
the 1920s, took on patriotic overtones during World War II, and then was
essentially racialized and criminalized by the 1980s when the area flipped from
white to Latino.” 73 However, after facing a severe housing affordability crisis,
California today has a more receptive policy toward informal housing units. The
state enacted a series of Accessory Dwelling Units Laws to provide an additional
income source for homeowners and affordable housing for low-income renters.74
Other states and local governments enacted similar laws to change restrictive
zoning and building standards, as well as streamline permit and licensing
procedures for accessory dwelling units.75 Such policies mark a significant step
towards regularizing informal housing.
Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119 (1994); Manuela Tomei, Decent Work for Domestic Workers:
Reflections on Recent Approaches to Tackle Informality, 23 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 185 (2011).
69. See generally Noah J. Durst & Jake Wegmann, Informal Housing in the United States, 41 INT’L
J. URB. & REG’L RSCH. 282 (2017).
70. PRATT CTR. FOR CMTY. DEV., CONFRONTING THE HOUSING SQUEEZE: CHALLENGES FACING
IMMIGRANTS TENANTS AND WHAT NEW YORK CAN DO 21 (2008),
http://www.maketheroadny.org/pix_reports/PrattCenter-Confronting_the_Housing_Squeeze.pdf
[hereinafter CONFRONTING THE HOUSING SQUEEZE].
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Becky Nicolaides, From Resourceful to Illegal: The Racialized History of Garage Housing in Los
Angeles, BOOM CALIFORNIA (Jan. 31, 2019), https://boomcalifornia.org/2019/01/31/from-resourceful-toillegal/#_ednref5; Brian J. Sullivan & Jonathan Burke, Single-Room Occupancy Housing in New York City:
The Origins and Dimensions of a Crisis, 17 CUNY L. REV. 113, 121 (2013) (arguing that, in the 1970’s,
reformers “informed by class biases, social prejudices, and varying degrees of xenophobia and racism”
eliminated single-room occupancy housing (SRO) that housed immigrants and the working class in the
New York City).
74. CAL. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND CMTY. DEV., ACCESSORY DWELLING UNIT HANDBOOK 8 (2020),
https://www.hcd.ca.gov/policy-research/docs/adu_december_2020_handbook.pdf.
75. See John Infranca, Housing Changing Households: Regulatory Challenges for Micro-Units and
Accessory Dwelling Units, 25 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 53, 54, 83, 84 (2014) (discussing the regularization
of ADUs such as attics, basements, backyard cottages, and units above a garage in New York, Washington,
D.C., Austin, Denver, and Seattle); Margaret F. Brinig, Grandparents and Accessory Dwelling Units:
Preserving Intimacy and Independence, 22 ELDER L.J. 381, 383 (2015) (discussing social benefits of
regularizing ADUs).
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Housing Crisis as a Driver of Informality

The prevalence of informal housing in the U.S. is directly connected to a
severe crisis in the low-income housing market. The extent of America’s housing
crisis, which is particularly pronounced in major cities, is reflected in the
intertwined problems of lack of affordable, stable, and secure housing.76 The lack
of affordable housing units in locales that provide suitable access to jobs, schools,
and other social services for low-income social segments is a driver of the crisis.77
While 12.5 million of the nation's nearly 43.7 million renter households have
access to 46 million affordable units, the 10.9 million extremely low-income renter
households have access to only 7.3 million affordable rental homes.78 Low-income
renters spend a large share of their income on housing, leaving little money for
other necessities. According to the federal poverty guidelines, households
spending more than thirty percent of their monthly income on housing are “costburdened.”79 But a recent estimate — from before the economic crisis onset by
the COVID-19 pandemic — 80 showed that 12 million homeowners and renter
households were “severely cost-burdened,” spending more than fifty percent of
their monthly incomes on housing.81 Seventy-one percent of the country's 10.9
million extremely low-income renters are especially likely to be “severely costburdened,” spending more than half of their incomes on rent.82 As the following
graph shows, whereas renter households who have “above-median-income” can
afford and have access to 46 million units, 10.9 million “extremely-low-income”

76. Matthew Desmond & Monica Bell, Housing, Poverty, and the Law, 11 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI.
15, 16, 28 (2015).
77. See Quinn Mulholland, Transportation Mobility and Housing, NATIONAL HOUSING CONFERENCE
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://nhc.org/transportation-mobility-and-housing/.
78. ANDREW AURAND, ET AL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOMES 3, NAT’L LOW
INCOME HOUS. COAL. (Mar. 2020), https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2020.pdf.
79. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Rental Burdens: Rethinking Affordability Measures, PD&R
EDGE, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr_edge_featd_article_092214.html (last visited May 25,
2021) [hereinafter Rental Burdens].
80. Matthew Haag & Conor Dougherty, #CancelRent Is New Rallying Cry for Tenants. Landlords
Are Alarmed, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/nyregion/rent-strikecoronavirus.html.
81. Glenn Thrush, As Affordable Housing Crisis Grows, HUD Sits on the Sidelines, N.Y. TIMES (Jul.
27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/us/politics/hud-affordable-housing-crisis.html.
82. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., supra note 78, at 1.

172

The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy

[Vol. XXVIII

renter can afford only 7.3 million units and must compete against all other
renters.83
The housing market in the U.S. is dictated mostly by a free market policy.84
The belief underlying this policy is that increased demand will stimulate
investment in the sector.85 But the market supply has consistently failed to keep up
with the country's low-income housing needs.86 Regulatory practices concerning
low-income housing development pose major supply-side constraints on new
housing developments. According to a recent report by the Joint Center for

Housing Studies of Harvard University, “[t]he rising costs of construction, land,
and labor, along with restrictive land use regulations, impede production of both
subsidized and market-rate rental housing.”87 Complex and costly exclusionary
zoning laws and practices have also steered housing supply away from low-income
83. Id. at 4.
84. See David Harvey, Forward to RAQUEL ROLNIK, URBAN WARFARE: HOUSING UNDER THE
EMPIRE OF FINANCE, at xi (Felipe Hirschhorn trans., Verso 2019). Globally, real estate industry investment
is close to nine trillion dollars and in the U.S. one hundred sixty-two billion dollars. In 1978, the U.S.
Housing and Urban Development Department had a budget of eighty-three billion dollars to provide public
housing services, including limited equity co-ops with the support of cities and municipal governments for
non-market solutions. The budget was reduced to eighteen billion dollars in the 1980s, and during the
Clinton years, “a period of increasingly intensive neoliberal reforms, it was abolished entirely, along with
almost any prospect of municipal support for non-market solutions.” Id.
85. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019 1–6
(2019), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2019.pdf.
86. See Vicki Been & Leila Bozorg, Spiraling: Evictions and Other Causes and Consequences of
Housing Instability, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1408 (2017) (reviewing MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED:
POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016)); Michael Allan Wolf, HUD and Housing in the
1990s: Crises in Affordability and Accountability, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545, 545 (1991).
87. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING 2020 18 (2020),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_Americas_Rental_Housing_
2020.pdf.
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households.88 Regulatory barriers and “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) opposition
to new housing developments have contributed to the challenges facing lowincome families.89
Another aspect of the affordability crisis is the demand-side constraint. As
housing policy is geared toward homeownership90 and private sector developers
target high-profit-yielding housing developments, low-income renters are priced
out due to stagnant wages and aggressive cutbacks on social safety net programs.91
According to the National Low-Income Housing Coalition, a worker earning the
federal minimum wage must work nearly 127 hours per week to afford a twobedroom rental home, or 103 hours per week to afford a one-bedroom rental home
at the national average fair market rent.92
The Economist magazine recently summarized the phenomena as “property
pathology” – “an infatuation with homeownership” rather than renting that is
undermining “growth, fairness and public faith in capitalism”:
The soaring cost of housing has created gaping inequalities and
inflamed both generational and geographical divides. In 1990 a
generation of baby-boomers, with a median age of 35, owned a
third of America's real estate by value. In 2019 a similarly sized
cohort of millennials, aged 31, owned just 4%. . . . And
homeowners of all ages who are trapped in declining places resent
the windfall housing gains enjoyed in and around successful
cities.93

88. Steven P. Katkov & Jon Schoenwetter, Minneapolis's Great Experiment: An Introduction to the
Minneapolis 2040 Comprehensive Plan, BENCH & BAR MINN. (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.mnbar.org/resources/publications/bench-bar/articles/2020/03/02/minneapolis-s-greatexperiment-an-introduction-to-the-minneapolis-2040-comprehensive-plan (quoting Britton v. Town of
Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991)).
89. Sara Pratt, Civil Rights Strategies to Increase Mobility, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 498, 507–12
(2017).
90. See A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not
Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 193–96 (2009).
91. David D. Troutt, Cities, Fair Housing, and Gentrification: A Proposal in Progressive Federalism,
40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1177, 1183–84 (2019); Andrea J. Boyack, Equitably Housing (Almost) Half a Nation
of Renters, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 109, 118–22 (2017).
92 . NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2019: 30TH ANNIVERSARY 1 (2019),
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2019.pdf.
93. Home Ownership Is the West’s Biggest Economic-Policy Mistake, ECONOMIST (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/01/16/home-ownership-is-the-wests-biggest-economic-policymistake. See also Arlo Chase, Rethinking the Homeownership Society: Rental Stability Alternative, 18 J.L.
& POL'Y 61, 61–62 (2009). (“For more than 85 years, the United States government has promoted
homeownership through mortgage programs, tax subsidies and popular rhetoric. . . . For the past 30 years,
government programs and resources have largely ignored the other dominant tenure form—renting. This
neglect of rental housing and rental households has helped create a troubling situation in which nearly half
of all rental households spend more than the government recommends on housing, putting such households
at risk of having insufficient resources for other necessities like food, medical care, transportation and
education.”).
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Varieties of federal and local low-income housing assistance are available.94
But they hardly match the demand, as only one in four qualified households
receives any kind of public housing assistance. 95 For low-income families, the
increasing cost of rent and associated lack of stable housing not only divert money
they need for food, healthcare, childcare, and other necessities — it has also
worsened their health and wellbeing. These cost increases drive low-income
families to live in substandard housing conditions, exposing them to health
hazards.96
While the high cost of housing affects low-income households of all races,
racial minorities face severe discrimination. For a long time government agencies,
banks, and financial intermediaries in the housing market “redlined” racial
minority neighborhoods to refuse lending for residents.97 Studies have documented
the structural forces fostering discrimination and racial disparities in the housing
market.98 The real estate financing industry has exploited even housing policies
and programs that are intended to mitigate racial disparities in the housing market
by deploying predatory lending schemes with exceptionally burdensome loan
terms.99 These practices have fostered a vicious cycle of declining property values
and residential segregation,100 exacerbating the racial inequality already embedded
in real estate markets.101
Poverty in the U.S. has a racial face, affecting immigrants and natives,102 and
discrimination is not limited to private market practices. Laws and public policies
have created and perpetuated persistent housing discrimination against African
Americans.103 As Richard Rothstein has shown, seemingly neutral governmental
policies, rules, and regulations have long underwritten exclusionary practices that
segregate Americans along racial lines in the housing market.104 A recent report by
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), concerning
94. See PUB. & AFFORDABLE HOUS. RSCH. CORP., HOUSING AGENCY WAITING LISTS AND THE
DEMAND FOR RENTAL ASSISTANCE 3–7 (Feb. 2016), https://www.housingcenter.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/waiting-list-spotlight.pdf.
95. Id. at 3 (citing Erika Poethig, One in Four: America’s Housing Assistance Lottery, URBAN (May
28, 2014), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/one-four-americas-housing-assistance-lottery).
96. See Abraham Gutman et al., Health, Housing, and the Law, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 251, 253 (2019);
Dayna Bowen Matthew, Health and Housing: Altruistic Medicalization of America's Affordability Crisis,
81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 161 (2018).
97 . See Charles L. Nier III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward A New Historical & Legal
Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617, 623–27 (1999).
98. See Douglas S. Massey, Racial Discrimination in Housing: A Moving Target, 52 SOC. PROBS.
148, 148–51 (2005).
99. See Hila Keren, Law and Economic Exploitation in an Anti-Classification Age, 42 FLA. ST. UNIV.
L. REV. 313, 322–31 (2015).
100. See KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL ESTATE
INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP 34–35 (2019).
101. See generally Vicki Been et al., The High Cost of Segregation: Exploring Racial Disparities in
High-Cost Lending, 36 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 361, 362–74 (2009) (discussing the role of residential
segregation and racial disparities in housing financial markets).
102. See Katja M. Guenther et al., The Impact of Intersecting Dimensions of Inequality and Identity
on the Racial Status of Eastern African Immigrants, 26 SOCIO. F. 98 (2011).
103. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 18, 20, 25, 42, 44, 51, 65–67, 70, 82, 102 (2017).
104. See id. at 59–60, 179–80, 188–93; Priya S. Gupta, Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief)
Legal History, 37 UNIV. HAW. L. REV. 187, 204–11 (2015).
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housing discrimination against racial and ethnic communities, shows that
discrimination is common across American cities.105 Regardless of class, white
home-seekers are far more likely than Black home-seekers and people of other
races to receive adequate information about available units, a timely appointment
to meet with real estate agents, the ability to inspect potential units, and the
time/ability to negotiate favorable terms of rent.106
B. Housing Insecurity
The affordable and fair housing crisis produces complex tenure insecurity,
exposing a steadily increasing number of low-income households to evictions.107
For example, in North Charleston, South Carolina, there were 3,660 evictions in
just one year––that is 10.03 low- income households evicted every day, or 16.5
percent of renters per year.108 Evictions in urban areas are not about the housing
supply falling short of the demand. A complex and path-dependent phenomenon
has produced spiraling effects of poverty among low-income households.109 These
households frequently face unstable housing conditions due to poverty, and their
unpredictable housing conditions feed into it, exacerbating a vicious,
intergenerational poverty cycle.110 According to research on housing and poverty,
the oppressive reality facing the poor in the housing market works as follows: if
you are poor, you are likely to be evicted as a consequence of the steadily
increasing gap between working class wages and rent.111 If you are evicted, you
are not likely to find a stable place to live because credit history screening and
eviction record surveillance work against you.112 Without a stable and decent place
to live, you will not have a steady job or income to maintain your health because
you need a place to live to be a productive worker. In addition, your children will
not have reliable access to education and health services. Without proper education
and health, they are also likely to be poor in the future. 113 Hence, the

105. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URB. DEV., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RACIAL AND
ETHNIC MINORITIES 2012, at xi, 69 (2013), https://www.huduser.gov/portal//Publications/pdf/HUD514_HDS2012.pdf.
106. See id. at 39–64.
107. See Karen Tokarz et al., Addressing the Eviction Crisis & Housing Instability Through
Mediation, 63 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 243, 243–44 (2020); Judith Fox, The High Cost of Eviction:
Struggling to Contain A Growing Social Problem, 41 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL'Y & PRAC. 167,
169–81 (2020); Breezy A. Schmidt, N. Dakota Case Study: The Eviction Mill's Fast Track to
Homelessness, 92 N.D. L. REV. 595, 623–29 (2017).
108. Eviction Rankings: Top Evicting Large Cities in the United States, EVICTION LAB,
https://evictionlab.org/rankings/#/evictions?r=United%20States&a=0&d=evictionRate&l=0 (last visited
May 25, 2021).
109. See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 4–5 (2016).
110. See id. at 15–16, 24–26, 69–70, 76, 257, 295–99.
111. See Terrence McCoy, Eviction isn’t Just About Poverty. It’s also About Race – and Virginia
Proves It, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/socialissues/eviction-isnt-just-about-poverty-its-also-about-race--and-virginia-proves-it/2018/11/10/475be8aed7bd-11e8-aeb7-ddcad4a0a54e_story.html.
112. Id.
113. UNDP, Center for Housing Policy Looks at Mobility's Effect on Children, 39 NO. CD-8 HDR
CURRENT DEVS. 11 (Apr. 18, 2011).
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intergenerational cycle of poverty and lives and livelihoods on the edge of
homelessness continues, especially for the poor-and-Black.114
Landlords evict tenants for a number of reasons, including delay or default in
paying rent, reporting domestic violence, complaining about housing code
violations, overcrowding (which could be as simple as having guests), and drug
abuse.115 Some grounds are not lawful causes for eviction,116 but landlords deploy
informal mechanisms such as the threat of eviction to coerce tenants to vacate their
premises.117
C. Eviction Record and Credit History Screening
The immediate effect of eviction for low-income households can be
homelessness. According to Matthew Desmond, most evicted families have no
idea where their next home will be.118 Eviction can also lead to a record that will
foreclose a tenant’s prospect for finding another rental house. Whether or not they
win the dispute, tenants involved in an eviction dispute are often blacklisted in the
rental market.119 Because landlords screen out tenants with an eviction record, a
tenant involved in an eviction proceeding will have a near permanently tarnished
record and markedly diminished prospects for renting a home in the market.120
Credit history records produce similar blacklisting effects. 121 Realtors and
other commodity vendors gauge consumers’ moral and financial prudence based
on their recorded credit histories. In today’s economy, one cannot have a
meaningful economic existence without having established a credible financial
identity. 122 Financial identity is legally formalized as an integral dimension of
individual identity, and relentless technological surveillance works to make
consumers “morally responsible, obedient, predictable, and profitable.”123
In the housing market, real estate agents and landlords look at credit histories
to gauge a potential renter's likelihood of defaulting on her rental

114. See Been & Bozorg, supra note 86, at 1408–09, 1412, 1415–16.
115. Id. at 1413–15, 1430 n.75.
116 . See David A. Dana, An Invisible Crisis in Plain Sight: The Emergence of the “Eviction
Economy,” Its Causes, and the Possibilities for Reform in Legal Regulation and Education, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 935, 950–52 (2017).
117. See Kennedy, supra note 62, at 80, 83.
118. See Desmond, supra note 109, at 97. See also Allyson E. Gold, No Home for Justice: How
Eviction Perpetuates Health Inequity Among Low-Income and Minority Tenants, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 59, 69 (2016).
119. Gary Williams, Can Government Limit Tenant Blacklisting?, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 1077, 1082–84
(1995).
120. Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to Protect Public
Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1356–64 (2007).
121 . See Shivangi Bhatia, To “Otherwise Make Unavailable”: Tenant Screening Companies’
Liability Under the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Theory, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2551, 2553, 2559
(2020); Erin Graves, Rooms for Improvement: A Qualitative Metasynthesis of the Housing Choice Voucher
Program, 26 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 346, 352, 354–55 (2016).
122. See Eric Dunn & Marina Grabchuk, Background Checks and Social Effects: Contemporary
Residential Tenant-Screening Problems in Washington State, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 319, 319–23, 337–
38 (2010).
123. JOSH LAUER, CREDITWORTHY: A HISTORY OF CONSUMER SURVEILLANCE AND FINANCIAL
IDENTITY IN AMERICA 4 (2017).
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responsibilities.124 Landlords use credit history reports with negative information
dating as far back as seven years as a predictor to determine whether a rental
applicant is a suitable tenant.125 More than seventy-two percent of landlords rely
on credit history screenings,126 which shows that having a robust credit score is
one of the standard prerequisites to rent a house in major cities across the U.S..
Companies providing renters’ background reports advertise credit screening as a
means to demonstrate that the tenant has a history of responsible borrowing and
paying her debts on time and that she can afford the rent.127 Landlords set the
required baseline credit score quite high and reject tenants with credit history
reports containing “too many inquiries,” “derogatory accounts or public records,”
and “insufficient debt experience.”128
Even though credit reports can be inaccurate and difficult to correct,129 for
many renters a lack of credit history or a bad credit score means that they may have
no place to live. Dunn and Grabchuk reported that individuals and families in
Washington denied housing due to inaccurate or misleading background reports
lacked the practical means to correct them.130 Potential renters often cannot afford
to pay the repeated screening fees demanded when they are forced to make serial
applications in their quest for housing.131
While technologies have revolutionized the ways rental housing providers
deploy credit history to screen tenants by, supplementing or even replacing
traditional tenant-screening tools with computer programs,132 many low-income
citizens are “credit invisibles.”133 According to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (C.F.P.B.), about 45 million Americans lack either a credit file with a
consumer credit reporting agency or enough credit information in their record to

124. Claudia DiGirolamo, The Scarlet E: A Call to New Jersey Lawmakers to Regulate Tenant
Screening Practices, 43 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 487, 488–89 (2019).
125. See The Renter’s Guide to Tenant Privacy Rights, PRIV. RTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/renters-guide-tenant-privacy-rights [hereinafter The Renter’s
Guide].
126. Bhatia, supra note 121, at 2559.
127. See, e.g., 7 Best Tenant Screening Services of 2021, RENTSPREE (Dec. 21, 2020),
https://www.rentspree.com/best-tenant-screening-services-2020/; Tyler Nicely, How to Run a Tenant
Credit Check, ZILLOW (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.zillow.com/rental-manager/resources/credit-reportsfor-landlords/.
128 . See Anna Reosti, “We Go Totally Subjective”: Discretion, Discrimination, and Tenant
Screening in a Landlord’s Market, 45 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 618, 640–42 (2020); Karim-Panahi v. 4000
Massachusetts Apartments, 302 F. Supp. 3d 330, 337 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd, No. 18-7054, 2018 WL
6167393 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2018).
129 . See Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit Reports
Damaged by Domestic Violence, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 363, 384 (2013).
130 . Eric Dunn & Marina Grabchuk, Background Checks and Social Effects: Contemporary
Residential Tenant-Screening Problems in Washington State, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. (SYMPOSIUM ISSUE)
319, 320 (2010).
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. “Credit invisibles” refers to people who don’t have a recorded financial history or scorable
financial record. See Kenneth Brevoort et al., Credit Invisibles and the Unscored, 18 CITYSCAPE 9, 9–10
(2016).
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generate a credit score.134 These credit invisible individuals are trapped in a ‘Catch22’ that is hard to escape because they need credit to qualify for a loan.135
The effects of having an eviction record or a bad credit history are not limited
to one's rental opportunities in the private market. Housing agencies administering
public or assisted housing programs also look at eviction records when screening
out applicants for public or assisted housing.136 Federal housing laws explicitly
authorize landlords to screen out tenants receiving housing assistance based on
their credit history and other background checks.137 Only one in four among those
eligible for public or assisted housing receive housing support, usually after
waiting for years.138 A low-income family with an eviction record could be denied
public housing assistance. 139 Keeping renters' eviction and late rent payment
history as key limitations on housing access in the private market is unforgivingly
rigorous in enforcing and reinforcing consumer surveillance in the housing
market.140
Courts have held that screening out renters who have a poor credit history does
not trigger fair housing or anti-discrimination laws. 141 But some states have
introduced regulations to enhance the accuracy of credit history reporting used by
landlords to screen out tenants. New York, Minnesota, and Oregon have adopted
various statutes to promote the accuracy of credit reports and limited safeguards
against their adverse effects.142 Unfortunately, such state laws are rare.
Credit history screening has severe consequences for new immigrants looking
for housing. It effectively excludes them from the formal rental market which
requires them to have a recorded financial history. Yet for the majority of renters,
such a history is necessary to establish the address and income to open a bank
account. For refugees and immigrants coming from developing countries, where
134. OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RSCH, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
CREDIT REPORTING PUBLIC HOUSING RENTAL PAYMENT DATA 9 (2019),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Potential-Impacts-of-Credit-Reporting.pdf.
135. Id.
136. For a list of the requirements, see HUD’s Public Housing Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog#:~:text=WHO%20IS%20ELIGIBLE%3F,citizenshi
p%20or%20eligible%20immigration%20status (last visited May 25, 2021).
137. Pasquince v. Brighton Arms Apartments, 876 A.2d 834, 840 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
138. Desmond, supra note 109, at 59.
139. Id. at 296.
140. Even if landlords do not charge renters fee for a background check, the cost of surveillance is
transferred to renters in general. See Been & Bozorg, supra note 86, at 1412–13. Late rent payments may
show up on one’s credit report if the landlord or management company has subscribed to the credit bureau
for this service. Late payments may also “be revealed if the landlord refers the matter to a collection agency
or if a civil court action, the first step toward eviction, is filed against the tenant.” The Renter's Guide,
supra note 125.
141. See Daniels v. Brooklyn Estates & Props. Realty, No. 07 CIV. 3626, 2010 WL 11537456, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010), aff'd, 413 Fed. Appx. 399 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding the plaintiff could not
establish a prima facie case for discrimination because defendants had a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory
rationale” for denying the renter’s application).
142. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. AND DEV. ET AL., IMPROVING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING
OPPORTUNITIES 8 (2017) (“The City recently revised its policies regarding the use of credit scores and debt
in the affordable housing screening process. Under the new policies, applicants cannot be denied because
of a low credit score alone; developers must take multiple factors into account when reviewing the credit
worthiness of an applicant.”); see also Gold, supra 118, at 81–82.
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the practice of recording financial histories is absent or uncommon, it is counterintuitive that having borrowed money from a formal financial body and paid it off
in time is better than never being indebted to such lenders.143
Aside from “amenity migrants”144 and those who have an employer, a family,
a sponsoring charity, or other means of arranging a dwelling place, few new
immigrants are likely to have the recorded financial history or steady income
source necessary to rent a home anywhere in a major city through the formal
market. 145 Only those admitted through overseas refugee processing agencies
receive temporary "reception and placement" support that includes interest-free
loans covering their transportation cost from a refugee camp to the U.S.146 Those
seeking asylum on arrival may receive emergency shelter and unstructured support
from communities and charities. For example, when Congolese refugees arrived
in Portland, Maine, in 2019, they sheltered in a basketball arena converted into an
emergency shelter.147
For the most part, until recent immigrants find a job, save enough, and
build a credit history that will allow them to rent a home in the formal market, they
have to rely on their friendship and kinship networks.148 Instead of visiting the
internet for housing advertisements, calling an apartment agent to inquire about
open units, or dropping by an apartment complex for a visit, they search for a place
to live by reaching out to their social contacts (often before arriving in the U.S.) or
visiting a café or community center frequented by their kinfolk.149 This search
frequently results in informal housing in single-family homes, illegally converted
units, unventilated basement rooms, a shared room in a rented apartment, or a
sleeping space in the apartment renter's living room. 150 In places where the
143. Interview with Sebr. See also ANNA PAULSON ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCESS FOR IMMIGRANTS:
LESSONS FROM DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES 22, 26, 34 (2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/20060504_financialaccess.pdf.
144. Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Problem of Amenity Migrants in North America and
Europe, 45 URB. LAW. 849, 852–53 n.13 (2013) (“Amenity migrants” refers to those settling in the U.S.
or other wealthy countries as investors or retirees buying a home).
145. See Sally French, The Best Ways for Immigrants to Build Credit, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/money/immigrants-build-credit/; Dara Duguay, Another Barrier for
Immigrants: Their Credit History, HILL (Sept. 6, 2019, 1:30 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/politics/460243-another-barrier-for-immigrants-their-credit-history. Refugees and asylees who come
from developing countries are particularly unlikely to have a recorded financial history or credit record.
The U.S. admitted about 85,000 refugees in 2016 alone and 76,000 over the last three years. See Jens
Manual Krogstad, Key Facts About Refugees to the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/07/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/. NADWA
MOSSAAD, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. OFF. OF IMMIGR, STAT., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEE
AND ASYLEES 6 (2018) (Asylum applicants in the U.S. were about 115,356 in 2016, 139,777 in 2017, and
105,472 in 2018).
146. Steven Sacco, Indebted Asylum: Why the Travel Loan Requirement for Refugees Is A Failure of
the United States to Meet Its Obligations Under the Convention on the Status of Refugees, 19 GONZ. J.
INT'L L. 1, 5–6 (2016).
147. Kate Taylor, Maine Needed New, Young Residents. African Migrants Began Arriving by the
Dozens, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/us/portland-maine-africanmigrants.html.
148. See Wei Li & Carlos Teixeira, The Housing and Economic Experiences of Immigrants in Canada
and the United States, in THE HOUSING AND ECONOMIC EXPERIENCES OF IMMIGRANTS IN U.S. AND
CANADIAN CITIES 3, 7–9 (Carlos Teixeira & Wei Li eds., 2015).
149. Interview with Tam.
150. Id.
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affordable housing shortage is acute, new immigrants may end up staying in
homeless shelters for as long as two or more years.151
Even when immigrants succeed in finding work, they have difficulty providing
evidence of a steady source of income.152 Landlords require such evidence and
screen out potential renters with income that is less than three times the monthly
rent. 153 Renters usually fulfill this requirement by presenting paystubs or
employment letters, but these are rarely available for new immigrants, who have
difficulty finding steady paying jobs before having a work permit and a place to
live.154 When they secure the necessary papers, new immigrants usually work in
minimum wage jobs such as serving in gas stations, local convenience stores, and
other service businesses that barely provide the income necessary to rent a safe and
decent place.155
IV. INFORMAL HOUSING AMONG IMMIGRANTS
As a consequence of the housing affordability crisis, about half a million
people in the U.S. are homeless, and nearly twelve million are "cost-burdened" or
"severely-cost-burdened.” 156 Whether one is a member of a low-income
household, a local youth, a migrant from another state, or an immigrant from
another country, obtaining affordable, safe, and decent shelter as envisioned by
tenant rights law can be nearly impossible. Affordable and secure rental housing
is particularly scarce in cities where there are jobs, easily accessible public transit
systems, and schools. 157 The degree of difficulty in securing housing varies
depending on one's race and socioeconomic background. 158 Any low-income
person seeking rental accommodation must prove a steady income source, supply
a reference from a previous landlord, demonstrate a robust credit history, and have

151. SERENA XIONG, KEY HOUSING ISSUES FACING IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN THE TWIN CITIES:
INTERVIEW WITH LEADERS FROM THE HMONG, LATINO, AND SOMALI COMMUNITIES 13 (2017),
https://www.mnbudgetproject.org/docs/default-source/default-documentlibrary/key_housing_issues_facing_immigrant_communities_in_the_twin_cities.pdf?sfvrsn=95423b70_8
.
152. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
153. Interview with Addis Arga, in Washington D.C. (Jan. 5, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter
hereinafter Interview with Addis Arga] [Note: The name of my sources and specific locations of the
interview are anonymized]. See also Comm'n on Hum. Rts. & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d
238, 251–55 (Conn. 1999).
154. Interview with Addis Arga.
155. Id.
156. See State of Homelessness: 2020 Edition, NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS
https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness2020/ (last visited May 25, 2021). According to Federal Poverty Guidelines, a household paying 30% of
their income on rent is cost burdened and a household paying 50% or more is severely cost burdened.
Rental Burdens, supra note 79.
157. For further discussion, see CONOR DOUGHERTY, GOLDEN GATES: FIGHTING FOR HOUSING IN
AMERICA XII-XIII (Penguin Press 2020); Evelyn Blumenberg et al., Transportation Access, Residential
Location, and Economic Opportunity: Evidence from Two Housing Voucher Experiments, 17 CITYSCAPE
89, 94–95 (2015).
158. See generally Andrew Hanson & Zackary Hawley, Do Landlords Discriminate in the Rental
Housing Market? Evidence From an Internet Field Experiment in U.S. Cities, 70 J. URB. ECON. 99 (2011).
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a clean eviction and criminal record.159 Compounding the housing market’s wagerent gap,160 these requirements present particularly severe challenges for recently
arrived immigrants, forcing them to seek shelter in the informal market.161
Immigrant renters are more prone to live in informal housing, as they face
severe challenges because of their triple status as renters, racial minorities, and
immigrants.162 According to a study on immigrants' housing conditions in New
York City, immigrants are more likely to pay high portions of their income for rent
than native-born tenants and more likely to live in overcrowded, illegal, and
substandard conditions.163
Informal housing arrangements are often good enough for a temporary stay.
An immigrant coming from a less well-off economic background may resign
herself to sharing an unventilated basement or loft with ten other immigrants. A
refugee from an overseas refugee camp is unlikely to think that an overcrowded,
unventilated, and substandard room in a U.S. city is the worst place to live.
However, as a citizen-to-be, anyone coming as an immigrant with big dreams and
ambitions would certainly be disenchanted by the experience. Informally rented
units flout building codes, occupancy regulations, and health and safety standards,
and the tenancies in such units are tenuous, overcrowded, unsanitary, hazardous,
and sometimes fraught with abuse and violence. 164 Hidden homelessness—
sleeping in closets or on their hosts/landlords' living room couches—is prevalent
159. See Laura Agadoni, The Requirements to Rent a House, SFGATE (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://homeguides.sfgate.com/requirements-rent-house-38824.html.
160. See OUT OF REACH 2020, supra note 9; PETER TEMIN, THE VANISHING MIDDLE CLASS:
PREJUDICE AND POWER IN A DUAL ECONOMY 27–40 (MIT Press 2017); Wes Rivers, Going, Going, Gone:
DC’s Vanishing Affordable Housing, FISCAL POL’Y INST. (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.dcfpi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/Going-Going-Gone-Rent-Burden-Final-3-6-15format-v2-3-10-15.pdf.
161. While the low-income housing crisis is widely recognized, it is rarely one of the top issues
discussed among housing challenges confronting immigrants. An exception is a body of scholarship that
emerged in response to local ordinances deployed by officials to deter the presence of undocumented
immigrants in their localities by tying rental regulation to the renters’ immigration status. These ordinances
placed undocumented immigrants' housing conditions in the country's politico-legal spotlight, resulting in
federal lawsuits that produced mixed outcomes. Jenna Christophel, Immigrant Survivor Housing Issues, J.
KAN. B. ASS’N., 87 Sept. 2018, at 38–39 (2018); Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Landlords, Latinos, and Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L.R.
55, 59–60 (2009). The issues raised by those ordinances and the lawsuits raised have positioned housing
in the intersection of alienage and property laws, attracting considerable attention among property law
scholars and immigration law scholars. Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership without Citizenship: The
Creation of Noncitizen Property Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 52 (2013) (recounting property law's
ambivalence toward alienage, argued that U.S. courts have failed to articulate a principled, rights-based
approach to noncitizen property and proposed an increased and formalized protection for noncitizen
property rights as a step towards humane treatment of noncitizens and modernization of property law).
Bender, supra note 5. California, Illinois, and other states have also proactively legislated to secure housing
rights irrespective of the tenants’ alienage status and prevent property from being weaponized in battles
over immigration policy. See Illinois Governor Pritzker Signs Immigrant Tenant Protection Act into Law,
96 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1, 1 (2019).
162. CONFRONTING THE HOUSING SQUEEZE, supra note 70, at 20.
163. Id. at 3, 14.
164. See TOM WATERS & VICTOR BACH, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, HOUSING THE CITY OF IMMIGRANTS
12–13 (Mar. 2011), https://b.3cdn.net/nycss/6174637efe14b4c944_l2m6b8b6d.pdf; Meaghan Fitzpatrick
& Leslye E. Orloff, Abused, Abandoned, or Neglected: Legal Options for Recent Immigrant Women and
Girls, 4 PENN ST. J.L. & INT'L AFFS. 614, 641–42 (2016); Suketu Mehta, The Asylum Seeker, NEW YORKER
(July 25, 2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/01/the-asylum-seeker.
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among recently-arrived immigrants.165 The U.S. may welcome immigrants, or it
used to, "but its housing does not."166
Since the late 1960s, when a new law discarded the "national origins" quota
system,167 the country's immigration system and immigrants' racial, economic, and
professional profiles have significantly changed. As popular culture depicts,
immigrants historically assimilated into the U.S. economy and society by moving
up the social ladder.168 This representation reflected the experiences of European
immigrants, who faced on arrival a variety of social and economic barriers that
limited their access to housing to rundown tenements in industrial towns before
they eventually moved up the social ladder.169
Recent immigrants are more diverse in terms of race, national origin,
education, and other social identifiers than the pre-1960s mostly European
immigrants.170 In 2017, foreign-born immigrants represented about 13.6 percent of
the U.S. population.171 A quarter came from Mexico, with the next largest groups
being from China (six percent), India (six percent), the Philippines (four percent)
and El Salvador (three percent), with the rest coming from almost every country
in the world. 172 They have encountered a new economy and labor market. As
sociologists Emily Rosenbaum and Samantha R. Friedman describe, "today's
economy is shaped more like an hourglass, with many low-paying jobs requiring
little education at the bottom, many high-paying job [sic] requiring advanced
degrees at the top, and far fewer jobs in between."173 The middle range jobs have
disappeared, presenting an insurmountable barrier to the prospect of an affordable,
decent, safe, secure home and upward mobility in the economy.
Further, while Europeans experienced spatial assimilation, 174 recent
immigrants assimilate through "segmented assimilation," whereby structural
factors such as race and economic class play a more significant role than individual

165. See JENNIFER SIMMELINK, CTR. FOR URB. AND REG’L AFFS., HIDDEN HOMELESSNESS:
REFUGEES AND HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES 22 (2009),
https://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/195645.
166. Nikita Stewart et al., Underground Lives: The Sunless Lives of Immigrants in Queens, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/23/nyregion/basements-queensimmigrants.html.
167. Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/.
168. EMILY ROSENBAUM & SAMANTHA R. FRIEDMAN, THE HOUSING DIVIDE: HOW GENERATIONS
OF IMMIGRANTS FARE IN NEW YORK'S HOUSING MARKET 39 (New York University Press, 2007).
169. Id. at 34–35.
170. Abby Budiman et al., Facts on U.S. Immigrants, 2018, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/20/facts-on-u-s-immigrants/ (“In 1960, 84% of
immigrants living in the U.S. were born in Europe, Canada or other North American countries, while only
6% were from Mexico, 4% from Asia, 3% from the rest of Latin America and 3% from other areas.
Immigrant origins now differ drastically, with European, Canadian and other North American immigrants
making up only a small share of the foreign-born population (13%) in 2018”).
171. Id.
172. Budiman et. al., supra note 170. Among immigrants ages five and older, Spanish is the most
commonly spoken language. Some 43% of immigrants in the U.S. speak Spanish at home. The top five
languages spoken at home among immigrants outside of Spanish are English (17%), followed by Chinese
(6%), Hindi (5%), Filipino/Tagalog (4%) and French (3%). Id.
173. ROSENBAUM & FRIEDMAN, supra note 168, at 39.
174. Id. at 34–36.
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qualities. 175 While the European immigrants of the pre-1960s ascended the
economic and social ladders in an immigrant-friendly law and policy setting,
recent immigrants confront a restrictive law and policy environment that severely
impedes their access to the formal housing market and integration into the broader
economy and society.176
A. The Public Charge Rule and the Immigrant Sponsorship Program
Over the last several decades, laws and policies concerning immigrants have
created and fostered informality in the housing market. The Housing and
Community Development Act of 1980 and the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 have restricted access to public or assisted
housing to a limited category of "qualified aliens." 177 This category includes
permanent residents, refugees, asylees, parolees paroled for a period of at least one
year, and noncitizens whose deportations are being withheld based on prospective
persecution.178 Because of a chronic shortage,179 eligible and qualified immigrants
rarely access public or assisted housing.180
From an immigration law standpoint, the policy is to exclude those who could
not afford housing from admission into the country.181 As a condition of admission,
immigration law requires that immigrants prove they are not likely to be a “public
charge” by presenting evidence to immigration officers showing that they have
sufficient resources to support themselves when they arrive in the U.S. 182 The
public charge concept has played some role in immigration law since the late
nineteenth century, but the idea that aliens must be self-sufficient was solidified in
immigration law in 1996 and further extended in 2019 to restrict the admission of
immigrants.183
The public charge rule applies to all immigrants except refugees, asylees,
Afghans and Iraqis with special immigrant visas, individuals applying under the
Violence Against Women Act, Special Immigrant Juveniles, and the members of

175. Alejandro Portes & Min Zhou, The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its
Variants, 530 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 74, 83–85, 96 (1993).
176. See generally JooHee Han, Does Skin Tone Matter? Immigrant Mobility in the U.S. Labor
Market, 57 DEMOGRAPHY 705 (2020); Zoua M. Vang, The Limits of Spatial Assimilation for Immigrants’
Full Integration: Emerging Evidence from African Immigrants in Boston and Dublin, 641 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 220 (2012).
177. Gregory T. W. Rosenberg, Alienating Aliens: Equal Protection Violations in the Structures of
State Pub.-Benefit Schemes, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417, 1424–29 (2014).
178 . MAGGIE MCCARTY & ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31753, IMMIGRATION:
NONCITIZEN ELIGIBILITY FOR NEEDS-BASED HOUSING PROGRAMS 1–2 (2018).
179. See Ericka Petersen, Building A House for Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Evictions, 16 STAN. J.
CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 63, 72–74 (2020); AURAND ET AL., supra note 78, at 10–12.
180. See Jason Dzubow, HUD Shuts the Door: Restrictions on Housing Assistance to Noncitizens, 9
GEO. IMM. L.J. 801, 803–06 (1995).
181. See Joseph Daval, The Problem with Pub. Charge, 130 YALE L.J. 998 (2021).
182. Stephanie L. Tang, Arguing Affidavits of Support, 105 ILL. B.J. 34, 34–38 (2017).
183. See Tania Morris Diaz & Marie S. Nelson, The New Pub. Charge Immigration Rule & Its
Impact, 99 MICH. B.J. 24 (2020); Linton Joaquin & Braden Cancilla, Protecting Immigrants and the
Community: A New Approach to Public Charge Determinations, 76 NO. 22 INTERPRETER RELEASES 887
(1999). President Biden’s administration has recently reversed the 2019 Public Charge Rule. Exec. Order
No. 14012, 86 Fed. Reg. 8277, 8277 - 8280 (Feb 2, 2021).
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a few other categories. 184 In evaluating the financial circumstances of an
immigrant, consular officers have some discretion. 185 Those who do not have
enough resources may fulfill the requirement by providing an affidavit of support
signed by a U.S. citizen who undertakes to sponsor the immigrant.186 All familybased immigrants and most employment-based immigrants must have at least one
U.S. citizen or permanent resident sponsor who has signed Form I–864.187 This
affidavit is mandatory and legally enforceable, binding the sponsor towards the
government as well as the sponsored immigrant. 188 The sponsor's principal
obligation is to provide "whatever support is necessary to maintain the sponsored
immigrant at an annual income that is at least 125% of the federal poverty level
annual guideline."189 The obligation lasts until the sponsored immigrant is credited
with forty qualifying quarters of work, which is about ten years unless the sponsor
or the sponsored immigrant dies, the sponsored immigrant becomes a U.S. citizen,
or the sponsored immigrant permanently departs the U.S. 190 The sponsored
immigrant is not required to seek employment or other means of mitigating
damage to seek the support from the sponsor.191 Immigrants who are not legally
required to file Form I-864, such as Diversity Visa immigrants, but who may be
inadmissible on the public charge grounds, file Form I-134. This form is not legally
enforceable.192 But Diversity Visa and some other immigrants usually overcome
the public charge requirement by having a sponsor file this form to show that they
will not become a public charge.
The sponsorship program generates practices among immigrant communities
that deviate from legal expectations. The law requires that the sponsor support the
sponsored immigrant financially, by paying for healthcare, housing, and any other
needs. 193 In practice, however, the immigrants’ family and the immigrant
community in the U.S. do not expect the sponsor to fulfill his or her obligation. A
generous sponsor might host a sponsored immigrant for a week or two. Well-off
sponsors with children may provide housing and other benefits in return for
184. For a list of exempt noncitizens, see 8 CFR § 212.23 (2019). See also Mark C. Weber, Of
Immigration, Public Charges, Disability Discrimination, and, of All Things, Hobby Lobby, 52 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 245, 246–58 (2020).
185. Daval, supra note 181, at 1003 – 04.
186. See Affidavit of Support, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/affidavit-of-support [hereinafter
USCIS Affidavit of Support].
187. Charles Wheeler, The New Affidavit of Support and Sponsorship Requirements, 74 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1581, 1582 (1997); 8 U.S.C. § 1183 (“An alien inadmissible under [section 212(a)(4) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)] may, if otherwise admissible, be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney
General (subject to the affidavit of support requirement and attribution of sponsor’s income and resources
under section 1183a of this title) upon the giving of a suitable and proper bond . . . .”)
188 . John T. Burger, Contract Rights Under the I-864 Affidavit of Support: Seventh Circuit's
Reasoning Binds Courts' Hands in a Shifting Landscape for Public Charge Doctrine, 93 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 509, 509–10, 515 (2019).
189. Shumye v. Felleke, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
190. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(2).
191. In re Marriage of Kumar, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 870–71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); California Court
Holds That Sponsored Immigrant Has Standing to Enforce Affidavit of Support in State Court, and No
Duty to Mitigate Damages, 94 INTERPRETER RELEASES, 47, 47 (2017).
192. Rojas-Martinez v. Acevedo-Rivera, No. CIV. 09-2048 (PG), 2010 WL 2404437, at *2-3 (D.P.R.
June 8, 2010).
193
See USCIS Affidavit of Support, supra note 186.
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domestic labor, especially when the sponsored immigrant is a woman. 194 If a
sponsored immigrant were to sue his or her sponsor and thereby violate the ethical
norm that “you do not bite the hand that fed you,” it would be a scandal. A
sponsored immigrant who complains against the sponsor would be shunned by
kinfolk here and at home. Also, as those who are well-off among immigrant
communities are usually expected to co-sign the affidavits, any such complaint
would be an incentive or excuse to decline future requests. Thus, there is intense
pressure against seeking support from one's sponsor, and disputes involving
sponsorship agreements rarely end up in court, except in cases involving spouses,
which usually occur only after a divorce.195
V. INFORMALITY AS THE ONLY ROUTE TO RENT A HOME
Discussions with immigrants and people familiar with their
situation reveal that a new immigrant starts looking for a place to live by finding a
contact who might have a place to accommodate her or be able to refer her to
someone else. 196 The referral process occurs within a community of common
acquaintances or "home" places. One's social bond within such a community is
indispensable to generate the chains of referrals leading to an affordable dwelling
arrangement. The formation of socially "enclaved"197 immigrant settlements, often
along the lines of ethnicity, partly reflects people’s dependency on social contacts
rather than on the formal law and market in seeking accommodation. 198 The
settlement pattern of immigrants confirm the significance of informal, social
interdependence for housing. According to PEW Research Center, almost half of
the 44.4 million immigrants to the U.S. in 2017 live in just three states: California,
Texas, and New York.199 California had the largest immigrant population of any
state, at 10.6 million.200 About twenty nine million immigrants lived in just twenty
major metropolitan areas. 201 According to the PEW Research Center, African
immigrants are likely to settle as follows: thirty-nine percent in the South, twenty-

194. One of my interviewees, Sebr, knew of several instances among Ethiopian and other African
immigrants where a sponsored woman immigrant had stayed for years under despicable conditions
(without adequate pay, unable to access language schools or to open a bank account) raising sponsor’s
children. Interview with Sebr.
195. See, e.g., Shumye v. Felleke, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1022–29 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
196. Interview with Addis Arga.
197. Sociologists use the term ‘enclave’ in a technical sense to refer to “advanced” socializations
whereby specific groups foster business and employment in a defined area of a town/city. See SARAH J.
MAHLER, AMERICAN DREAMING: IMMIGRANT LIFE ON THE MARGINS 11–14 (1995). Here the term is used
in a loose sense to describe settlement within which networks of families, friends, and acquaintances
provide housing referrals, chains, and platforms.
198. Informalities contribute to shaping immigrants’ settlement pattern in the U.S. along the lines of
ethnic cleavages in the home country. Among Ethiopian immigrants—Oromos and Somalis reside largely
in the Minneapolis area, Amhara in D.C., Los Angeles, and Tigrians in Denver.
199. Jynnah Radford & Luis No-Bustamante, Facts on U.S. Immigrants, 2017, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June
17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2019/06/03/facts-on-u-s-immigrants-2017-data/.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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five percent in the Northeast, eighteen percent in the Midwest, and seventeen
percent in the West.202
Texas, New York, California, Maryland, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and
Virginia are home to at least 100,000 African immigrants.203 In Minnesota and
South Dakota, African immigrants represent the largest number of foreign-born
residents.204 The data below illustrates where African immigrants settle in specific
counties suggesting strong correlation between settlement, social ties, and housing.
Sub-Saharan African Immigrant Population
in the U.S. (2015–2019): 2,151,400
By State and County (more than 2000)
Harris County, Texas

66,000

Los Angeles County, California

56,800

Bronx County, New York

56,100

Montgomery County, Maryland

54,200

Hennepin County, Minnesota

52,000

Prince George's County, Maryland

51,400

Dallas County, Texas

41,400

Franklin County, Ohio

39,400

Cook County, Illinois

39,400

King County, Washington

39,200

Fairfax County, Virginia

39,200

Kings County, New York

32,200

Tarrant County, Texas

31,900

Suffolk County, Massachusetts

25,900

DeKalb County, Georgia

25,000

Source: Migration Policy Institute205

202. Monica Anderson, African Immigrant Population in the U.S. Steadily Climbs, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/14/african-immigrant-population-in-u-ssteadily-climbs/.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. U.S. Immigrant Population by State and County, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/us-immigrant-population-state-andcounty?width=850&height=850&iframe=true (last visited May 25, 2021).
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Ethiopian Immigrants in the U.S. (2015–2019): 242,600
State and County (more than 2000)
Montgomery County, Maryland

15,400

King County, Washington

13,300

Fairfax County, Virginia

11,700

Clark County, Nevada

9,000

Dallas County, Texas

8,800

Hennepin County, Minnesota

8,200

DeKalb County, Georgia

8,100

Alexandria city, Virginia

7,800

Los Angeles County, California

7,300

Washington, District of Columbia

5,800

Ramsey County, Minnesota

5,400

Prince George's County, Maryland

4,400

Harris County, Texas

4,300

Arapahoe County, Colorado

4,200

Gwinnett County, Georgia

3,900

Source: Migration Policy Institute206
A. Specific Modes of Informality
Within such communities, informal dwelling arrangements can vary. In a
common type of informal housing arrangement, new immigrants rent a room as a
group from someone who owns a house or an apartment. These homes or
apartments are typically not in areas zoned for such leasing arrangements, as they
are in off-rental, single-family neighborhoods with occupancy and other local
regulations.207 Specific rooms or spaces rented to new immigrants in such houses
often lack proper ventilation, heating, and cooling facilities, flouting health and
safety codes. 208 As described in my introductory example, this type of rental
arrangement is especially popular among new homebuyers, who use the rent to pay
the mortgage repayment.
The homeowner earns rental income higher than the market rate because of the
apparent economies of scale. Despite the resulting overcrowding, renting a place

206. Id.
207. Interview with Addis Arga.
208. Id.
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as a group works by lowering the rent per individual.209 Nonetheless, the total rent
in such situations can be higher than the formal market rent for similar premises.210
A room that is meant for one person could be shared by several new immigrants.
Location—access to public buses and transit systems—and the amount of rent per
individual are the most critical considerations determining decisions to rent a
place.211
In such dwelling arrangements, the relations between the landlord and tenants
are informal in the sense that they are unwritten and often violate zoning,
occupancy, and health and safety codes. In theory, new immigrants dwelling in
such arrangements can claim tenant rights as tenants at will—i.e., tenants in a lease
that can be terminated at the volition of either the tenant or the landlord. 212
However, when several new immigrants share the homeowner’s living quarters,
no single tenant has exclusive possession, raising questions about the applicability
of tenant rights. Further, because such units are often illegal, flouting building
codes and occupancy permits, courts have sometimes rejected the enforcement of
such tenant rights claims as “contracts with illegal subject matter.”213
Another type of informal arrangement occurs between new immigrants and
renters. This is exemplified by the case of Habte,214 an immigrant from Ethiopia,
who rented a two-bedroom apartment in a private rental market with a friend and
proceeded to host two new immigrants who were referred to him by an
acquaintance. Habte did not conclude a rental agreement with them. Instead, he
reached an understanding with them that they would pay a "fair" amount of rent in
accordance with their income. Every morning the newcomers packed up their
sleeping mattresses and stored them away in a closet, leaving no evidence of their
presence in case Habte's landlord visited. When I spoke with him in January 2020,
he was hoping that the arrangement would be temporary. As his guests worked
most of the time, nights as well as days, their presence was not a serious problem
except for occasional disagreements concerning the use of furniture, the kitchen,
and the living room.
In this kind of arrangement, the renter of the house or apartment effectively
acts as a landlord sub-renting a room or a sleeping space. The practice is prevalent
and has many variations. Documenting one such variation among the Hispanic
immigrant community on Long Island, anthropologist Sarah J. Mahler provides an
ethnography of the encargado (“the person in charge”) whereby entrepreneurs
among the Hispanic immigrants rent homes from white middle-class property
owners and then sub-rent the houses to more recently arrived immigrants as
boarders.215
209. See Conor Dougherty, 12 People in a 3-Bedroom House, Then the Virus Entered the Equation,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/01/business/economy/housingovercrowding-coronavirus.html.
210. Rents in informal rentals are higher than the rents in formal market. See Desmond & Wilmers,
supra note 12, at 1093 – 96.
211. Interview with Addis Arga.
212. 1 TIFFANY REAL PROP., NATURE OF TENANCY, § 155 (3d ed. 2020).
213. Fazio v. Kelly et al., No. 35214/03, 2003 WL 22227363, at *4–6 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 10, 2003)
(holding that “since the basement apartment is illegal, there is no landlord tenant relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant . . .”).
214. Interview with Habte Selamu, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 6, 2020) (on file with author).
215. MAHLER, supra note 197, at 188, 207; see also Durst & Wegmann, supra note 69, at 289.
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This arrangement is generally akin to room-sharing. Nonetheless, immigrants
who live in these situations have much less control over space than those renting
from homeowners. In many cases, the practice of renting out leased premises to
new immigrants raises questions of legality. Renters of a house, apartment, or room
often do not have the authority to sub-rent the place. 216 This is the case, for
instance, for tenants in public or assisted housing or for a renter in a private rental
market where subletting to multiple sub-renters violates local occupancy rules.
One of my sources, Aman Maru, lived in a public housing unit that had a living
room and three bedrooms on the second floor.217 The housing agency rented the
house to AM's sister before she moved to a different part of the town. AM rented
out the three bedrooms to new immigrants and slept in the living room when he
took a break from his taxi driving business. He advised his tenants not to have their
mail delivered to the address and cautioned them that if anyone asked, they should
never admit to residing at the address. 218 He was wary of the inspections by
housing officials regarding occupants and occupancies.
B. The Precariousness of Informal Housing
Informal housing is overcrowded, unsanitary, and fraught with uncertainties,
insecurities, and sometimes abuse and violence. Even in standard tenancies, lowincome tenants burdened with little education or language barriers are often
uninformed of their rights, and so suffer numerous abuses at the hands of their
landlords. They “may go weeks without heat or water, or their stairways and
hallways may remain for long periods in dire need of repair.”219 Ann Aurelia Lopez
documented a case in which a family housed as many as ten people in a
deteriorating unit with less than 400-square-feet of living space, and another case
in which a couple shared a bedroom apartment with eight children. 220 In still
another case, a couple was residing in a 300-square-foot unit consisting of a living
room, kitchen, and a sleeping area, their three daughters sharing a hide-a-bed in
the living room.221 A recent study concerning the housing conditions of Hmong,
Latino, and Somali immigrants in the Twin Cities, Minnesota, reported not only
that these communities experienced a pervasive lack of affordable and decent
216. 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(7) (2016) (stating that tenants in the Housing Choice Voucher Program
may not sublet their units); see also Williams v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 213 A.3d 1275, 1279–80 (D.C. 2019).
Tenants who rent out public housing units could be criminally prosecuted. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez,
Tenant Accused of Cheating Subletters in Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/nyregion/09arrest.html.
217. Interview with Aman Maru, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 14, 2020) (on file with author).
218. Housing authorities often terminate benefits if tenants permit an unauthorized occupant without
the consent of the authorities. See, e.g., Norwich Hous. Auth. v. Majewski, No. CV 219883, 2000 WL
73034, at *4–5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 2000).
219. Michele Cortese, Property Rights and Human Values: A Right of Access to Private Property for
Tenant Organizers, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 257, 257–58 (1986); see also Hope Harvey, When
Mothers Can’t “Pay the Cost to Be the Boss”: Roles and Identity within Doubled-Up Households, SOC.
PROBS. 1, 1–3 (2020)(discussing subordinate conditions of mothers in shared “doubled-up” homes and
their struggles to assert their social roles); Marc L. Roark, Under-Propertied Persons, 27 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2017) (discussing how the materially impoverished are invisible in property law).
220. BENDER, supra note 10, at 37 (2010) (citing ANN AURELIA LOPEZ, THE FARMWORKERS'
JOURNEY 151 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007)).
221. Id.
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housing and faced severe overcrowding and discrimination, but also that race had
considerable significance in determining their housing conditions. 222 In the
neighborhoods with Somali populations, a major concern was racial profiling and
complaints by white neighbors.223
In some places, immigrants' presence creates tensions with homeowners who
report housing-code violations, often stirring up racially imbued conflicts.224 In
2014, officials in Fairfax County, VA, reported that housing agencies received as
many as 20,000 complaints per year, leading to about 9,000 investigations that
included investigations into places that had been illegally converted into
apartments or that were otherwise too crowded.225 Immigrants' tenure under such
conditions is one step away from a phone call to a housing agency, since the law
does not protect tenants in illegal units.226
Tensions between immigrants and low-income renters who are citizens
sometimes appear on the legal scene, as the latter may experience conflicts with
immigrant neighbors and sue the landlords. In Jarvis v. Burnt Mills Crossing, LLC,
for instance, a "Black Native American" claimed that the landlord had violated his
rights under the Fair Housing Act by refusing to renew his rental agreement
because he had complained about “African and Hispanic immigrant tenants”
making noise.227 In DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties Inc., the plaintiff claimed
that apartment managers sought immigrants as renters to avoid paying for the
upkeep of the apartment. 228 Although neither of these claims succeeded, they
reveal horizontal social tensions connected to housing and immigration.
Immigrants often face abuse and violence in informal housing. Diversity Visa
immigrants face particularly challenging conditions. One of my sources, Temeg,229
had a typical immigrant experience. When he came as a Diversity Visa immigrant,
he lived with Tad, who lived in a rented one-bedroom apartment. Temeg slept in
the living room while working at Dulles International Airport for over a year. He
then moved to St. Louis, Missouri, where he worked as an information technology
expert and sponsored his wife to come from Ethiopia. Now, in 2021, Temeg lives
in Virginia with his wife and child. Last year, his wife heard about Chalag, a young
man who had just moved to the Washington, D.C., area after an altercation with
his sponsor in Michigan. Chalag is also a Diversity Visa immigrant and planned to
settle in Michigan in the vicinity of his sponsor, whom he met through a family
contact before he left Ethiopia. However, he left his sponsor's home after a short
while because the sponsor wanted Chalag to marry and sponsor a relative of his
who wished to emigrate to the U.S. Chalag refused as he had a fiancée, and the
222. See CURA, MINN. BUDGET PROJECT, & MINN. HOUS. P’SHIP, KEY HOUSING ISSUES FACING
IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN THE TWIN CITIES: INTERVIEW WITH LEADERS FROM THE HMONG, LATINO,
AND SOMALI COMMUNITIES 14 (2017), https://www.mhponline.org/images/Immigrant-research-final.pdf.
223. See Id.
224. Antonio Olivo, In Fairfax, Housing-Code Complaints Stir Up Tensions as Some Immigrants
Feel Targeted, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginianews/2014/03/29/88e6dc96-b5e1-11e3-8cb6-284052554d74_story.html.
225. Id.
226. CONFRONTING THE HOUSING SQUEEZE, supra note 70, at 21.
227. Jarvis v. Burnt Mills Crossing, LLC, No. CIV.A. TDC-14-3477, 2015 WL 5092029, at *1–2 (D.
Md. Aug. 27, 2015).
228. See DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 244–45 (3d. Cir. 2012).
229. Interview with Temeg Bacha, in Washington, D.C., (Jan. 8, 2020) (Interview on file with author).

No. 2]

Tenants Without Rights

191

sponsor responded by withholding his immigration documents. Chalag now lives
with Temeg and his wife in a room of their two-bedroom rented apartment, sharing
a “modest” portion of the rent. In a process involving protracted and bitter
negotiations with the Michigan sponsor, Temeg helped Chalag retrieve his
Permanent Residence Card and some other official immigration-related mail that
had been delivered to the sponsor's address.
Gender also plays a considerable role in shaping insecurities and violence in
informal dwelling arrangements. Research on low-income women renters in U.S.
cities suggests that violence is pervasive among those who face housing
insecurity. 230 For example, Professor Rigel Oliveri's recent pilot survey in
Columbia, Missouri, found evidence of widespread sexual harassment, ranging
from requests for sexual favors in exchange for a rent discount to unwanted
physical advances and forced entry into the rental premises. 231 If native-born
citizens confront widespread harassment and violence in rented homes, it is safe to
conclude that immigrants in informal housing with precarious economic
conditions, social vulnerabilities, and extremely limited access to law and law
enforcement resources confront pervasive harassment and violence.232 Selamawit's
experience is a case in point.233 She emigrated from Ethiopia, and while her asylum
application in the U.S. was pending, she lived as a roommate with four male
Ethiopian immigrants in a high-rise apartment in Prince George’s County, MD.
She made this arrangement with the help of her social contacts, as she lacked the
steady income and credit history necessary to rent a safe and decent place. One of
her roommates attacked her with sulfuric acid, resulting in severe burns to her
body.234
C. Claiming Rights in Informal Tenancies
Would the problems now facing informal tenants go away if state legislatures
enacted statutes to collapse the tenant/licensee distinction and confer tenant rights
on all residential renters? This section shows that the precariousness of informal
housing is partly connected to unequal access to justice and other structural
problems. Since housing informality operates in a twilight zone of legality whose
inhabitants enjoy only ambiguous rights and remedies, conferring tenant rights on
informal tenants could signal formal equality and produce important symbolic
value. However, rights must be practically actualized by courts, government
agencies, and a broad set of economic and social practices to be a means of
230. See Louise Fitzgerald, Unseen: The Sexual Harassment of Low-Income Women in America, 39
EQUAL., DIVERSITY & INCLUSION: INT’L J. 1, 5, 6–7 (2020).
231. Rigel C. Oliveri, Sexual Harassment of Low-Income Women in Housing: Pilot Study Results, 83
MO. L.R. 597, 615, 620–21 (2018).
232. Sarah C. Pricer, When Home Is A Living Hell: Vulnerable Women & Sexual Harassment in
Housing, 6 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 115, 125–30 (2020). For a discussion of unique vulnerabilities of
immigrant women, see generally Jeanne Murphy et al., “They Talk Like That, But We Keep Working”:
Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault Experiences Among Mexican Indigenous Farmworker Women in
Oregon, 17 J. IMMIGRANT & MINORITY HEALTH 1834 (2015).
233. See Salem Solomon & Mestawet Aragaw, After Horrific Attack, Ethiopian Immigrant Rebuilds
Her Life, VOA (Sept. 15, 2018, 8:26 PM), https://www.voanews.com/usa/after-horrific-attack-ethiopianimmigrant-rebuilds-her-life.
234. Id.
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claiming secure and affordable housing. And the practice of claiming tenant rights
in the country’s low-income housing market shows that social inequality,
unbalanced access to justice, and deep structural problems have marred the
capacity of tenants to claim rights.235 These problems require deeper changes than
conferring rights in informal settings.
To be sure, courts have occasionally protected the rights of occupants even in
the absence of a standard landlord-tenant relationship or formal lease. 236 In
Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, Inc., the court ruled that a labor camp service
company could not use self-help to evict a farmworker without a judicial
process.237 In reaching its decision, the court relied on implied contractual rights
and public policy considerations.238 In State v. Shack, the court ruled that property
owners cannot deny a farmworker the right to be visited by a social worker and an
attorney providing services on the premises. 239 In State v. Coles, the court
protected the privacy rights of an informal tenant, holding that “the formality or
informality of a rental arrangement does not grant a landlord the authority to
consent to a search of the tenant's apartment."240
Notwithstanding these victories, tenant rights and remedies lack practical force
for a variety of reasons. One is the unequal power between tenants and landlords
to claim rights in the legal process. ‘Landlord’ and ‘tenant’ are generic terms. A
landlord can be an unemployed homeowner renting out a room or a multibilliondollar real estate company. Similarly, a tenant can be a single, middle-class young
professional or an immigrant living in an illegal slum rental, bed-sharing with
fifteen others in an unventilated basement room. 241 Nonetheless, abundant
empirical evidence shows that landlords generally wield greater power to mobilize
resources and win litigation. 242 Professor Russell Engler's review of recent
litigation data shows that in high-volume housing courts, few cases go to trial.243
Tenants rarely have access to a lawyer, but up to eighty-five to ninety percent of
landlords obtain professional legal representation. 244 “The typical case pits a
represented landlord against an unrepresented tenant.”245 Given the bleak chances
of winning in court and the negative impact of having a record of eviction, low 235. See Desmond & Bell, supra note 76, at 21.
236. See STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra note 30, at § 6.11.
237. Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, Inc., 415 A.2d 1156, 1167 (N.J. 1980). Leases for fixed terms
violating statutes of fraud have been enforced by "estoppel" and "part performance" doctrines without
turning the tenancy into an informal periodic tenancy.
238. Id. at 1164–66.
239. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971). In a few other cases, courts have granted tenant
status to farmworkers living in labor camp boarding rooms. See, e.g., State v. Fox, 510 P.2d 230, 232
(Wash. 1973) (“The workers paid for the right to live in the camp and enjoyed the status of tenants.”).
240. State v. Coles, No. A-2954-10T2, 2012 WL 1192053, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 11,
2012), aff'd as modified, 95 A.3d 136 (2014).
241. Olly Grender, Reform in the Private Rented Sector, in USING EVIDENCE TO END HOMELESSNESS
37, 39 (Lígia Teixeira & James Cartwright eds., 2020).
242. Ericka Petersen, Bldg. A House for Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Evictions, 16 STAN. J. CIV.
RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 63, 75–80 (2020); Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
243. Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal
About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 37, 47 (2010).
244. Id.
245. Id.
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income tenants are unlikely to seek legal remedies for housing conditions that
violate laws and regulations.
Further, courts require high standards to prove liability for housing code
violations. To establish liability for injuries linked to unsafe or substandard
housing conditions, the tenant must show that the landlord was affirmatively
negligent.246 To win against a regulatory agency for such conditions, the tenant
must prove selective enforcement or nonenforcement of regulatory codes and
discriminatory intent.247 These standards are too high to provide a realistic remedy
for housing code violations, even with legal representation.
The case of Rosario v. Town of Mount Kisco offers insights on the obstacles
tenants face in vindicating rights and claiming remedies with respect to housing
code and safety standard violations.248 In this case, Ramona J. Rosario sued Mount
Kisco, a town located in Westchester County, NY, and her landlord for the
wrongful death of her son, Haniel Reyes-Rosario, who died of burn injuries after
being trapped by a fire in his rented basement apartment.249 The basement had no
smoke detectors, fire extinguisher, or adequate emergency exit or rescue
openings. 250 Rosario claimed that the town failed to take steps to increase
affordable housing, regulate the rentals of substandard buildings, and “prosecute
landlords who charge unreasonable amounts of rent for unhealthy, unsafe and
illegal basements, attics and rooms.”251
This case arose against the backdrop of an earlier conflict between town
officials and immigrant communities. In the 1990s, in response to tensions between
immigrants and native residents, the town aggressively regulated occupancies by
unrelated people and restricted immigrants from soliciting work. 252 Housing
regulation became the town’s leading agenda as a growing presence of immigrants,
combined with a shortage of housing, “created the perfect conditions for landlords
to demand high rents for rented basements, attics, and other rooms.”253 The policy
led to lawsuits, and eventually, the town ceased the aggressive regulations
following a consent decree. 254 The plaintiff in Rosario charged that the town
shifted its policy from aggressive enforcement to not enforcing safety and health
housing codes, which contributed to the death of her son. 255 She also claimed
nonfeasance and affirmative negligence by the landlord for creating the dangerous
conditions leading to her son’s death.256 The court ruled that she did not provide
enough evidence to establish discriminatory intent on the part of the town or to
246. See Lennon v. Oakhurst Gardens Corp., 645 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
247. See Rosario v. Town of Mount Kisco,16-CV-8766 (NSR), 2020 WL 764280, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 14, 2020), withdrawn sub nom. Rosario v. Vill. of Mount Kisco, 20-956, 2020 WL 3250485 (2d Cir.
June 9, 2020).
248 . Rosario v. Town of Mount Kisco, No. 16-CV-8766 (NSR), 2018 WL 2209487, at *1–3
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2018).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. This is not unique to Mount Kisco. Many other local governments deployed ordinances to
inhibit the presence of immigrants. For a dispute concerning a local overcrowding ordinance, see Young
Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, FL, 529 F.3d 1027, 1033 (11th Cir. 2008)
252. Rosario, 2018 WL 2209487, at *1.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at *2.
256. Id. at *3.

194

The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy

[Vol. XXVIII

establish affirmative negligence and exclusive control of the property on the part
of the landlord.257
Recently arrived immigrants living in an informal rental arrangement are
less likely than low -income tenants to seek legal remedies for housing code
violations or other tenant rights because of lack of resources, language barriers,
and other vulnerabilities. 258 In theory, informal tenants can claim damages for
injuries caused by the defective condition of a premises. The elements required to
establish a property owner’s liability in such cases are lower than what is required
for liability in a landlord-tenant relationship, because property owners owe a duty
of reasonable care toward licensees or licensee’s guests.259 But in practice, new
immigrants are unlikely to claim rights against landlords because finding
alternative housing is difficult, and language and lack of financial resources limit
their ability to seek legal recourse.
VI. REGULARIZING INFORMAL TENANCIES
As immigrants' housing conditions are closely linked to the crisis in the lowincome housing market, policies that address the crisis can also mitigate the
housing problems facing immigrants. However, while everyone agrees that the
challenges facing low-income people in the housing market are grave,260 there is
no consensus on the solutions. Those who advocate market-based approaches
recommend deregulating the sector and giving incentives to private sector
developers to address the lack of housing. 261 “Supply skeptics” highlight that
luxury houses and apartments are glutting select neighborhoods, as private sector
developers cater to middle- and upper-income people, sidelining low- income
households trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty.262 They argue that the housing
crisis should be considered first and foremost a matter of public policy.263 Some
low-income housing advocates recommend increasing the supply of housing while
simultaneously boosting the demand-side support programs to steer new housing
developments and existing stock toward low -income households' needs.264 The
257. Id. at *9, *11, *12 (The ruling was on a motion to dismiss and problems with the plaintiff’s
complaint.).
258 . See Deena Greenberg et al., Discrimination in Evictions: Empirical Evidence and Legal
Challenges, 51 HARV. CIV. RTS. CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 115, 135–40 (2016); Robert L. Bach, Building
Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for Impoverished Immigrants, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639,
649 (1994).
259. See, e.g., Benham v. Morton & Furbish Agency, 929 A.2d 471, 474 (Me. 2007).
260. See, e.g., America’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Challenges and Solutions: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Finance, 115th Cong. 3 (2017) (opening statement of Sen. Wyden, describing affordable
housing crisis as a “five-alarm fire”).
261. See, e.G., COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 10
– 12 (2009), https://www.nhipdata.org/local/upload/file/The-State-of-Homelessness-in-America.pdf;
Thomas E. Walls, Affordable Housing: Plenty of Demand, But No Supply to Be Found, 24 N.C. BANKING
INST. 417, 428–34 (2020).
262. For a review of the “supply skeptics’” arguments, see Vicki Been et al., Supply Skepticism:
Housing Supply and Affordability, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 25, 28–34 (2019).
263. Id.
264. For proposed remedies to address racial and class injustice in housing, see, e.g., Jonathan
Rosenbloom, Reducing Racial Bias Embedded in Land Use Codes, 26 CITYLAW 49, 57–64 (2020); Andrea
J. Boyack, Sustainable Affordable Housing, 50 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 455, 485–96 (2018).
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recommendations in this vein include regulating restrictive occupancy rules265 and
local zoning regulation.266 But given the neoliberal political current and the clout
of the real estate industry in housing policymaking, 267 the kinds of significant
policy changes required to develop a housing policy that addresses the needs of
low-income people are unlikely to materialize.268 A country that has failed to house
its poor, voting citizens is unlikely to house non-voting immigrants through the
political process.
Even if radical changes in public policy are beyond reach, can tenant rights
law be extended from its current focus on the rights of renters with exclusive
possession of the premises to give meaningful protection for renters sharing
shelters or living in a property violating housing codes and regulations? The
conventional legal remedies proposed to address informal housing include
regulation, deregulation, and regularization. 269 While some studies suggest that
deregulation is a desirable way to address the health, safety, and wellbeing of
tenants in substandard housing, 270 regulation has attracted more attention. 271 A
regulatory approach could prevent informal housing if regulators strictly enforced
building codes and health and safety standards. 272 Nonetheless, strictly
implementing such common regulatory tools as “red-tagging” buildings that lack
proper permits or violate health and safety standards, penalizing property owners,
and expelling tenants in substandard housing, creates trade-offs.273 In particular, it
risks disrupting tenants’ lives and livelihoods. Given the acute shortage of
affordable housing, they would be exposed to homelessness if landlords were to
respond by removing units from the informal market or hedged their regulatory
risk by increasing rents. As Professor Duncan Kennedy explains, informality is
sensitive to neighborhood changes resulting from "a complex interaction between
the strategies of rival groups with conflicting interests." 274 Also, as Rosario

265. See, e.g., Brian J. Sullivan & Jonathan Burke, Single-Room Occupancy Housing in New York
City: The Origins and Dimensions of a Crisis, 17 CUNY L. REV. 113, 138–43 (2013).
266. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place:
Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667, 1688–95 (2016).
267. See John Whitlow, Community Law Clinics in the Neoliberal City: Assessing CUNY's Tenant
Law and Organizing Project, 20 CUNY L. REV. 351, 363–69 (2017).
268 . See Alana Semuels, When Wall Street Is Your Landlord, ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/single-family-landlords-wall-street/582394/?
269. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 63, at 143.
270. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Moral and Practical Dilemmas of an Underground Economy,
103 YALE L.J. 2157, 2172–73 (1994); Edward H. Rabin, Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law:
Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 578–584 (1984).
271. See Larson, supra note 63, at 157–69.
272. See generally Richard S. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall
Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1976);
Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing
Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971).
273 . See generally H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement and Urban Decline, 6 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 29 (1996) (discussing how housing code enforcement encouraged
landlords to abandon buildings); James Horner, Code Dodgers: Landlord Use of LLCs and Housing Code
Enforcement, 37 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 647 (2019) (discussing how landlords manipulate corporate law
alternatives to evade housing code enforcement).
274. Kennedy, supra note 62, at 91–92.
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shows, 275 regulatory agencies are not immune to pressures from the real estate
industry and those with an immigration agenda.276
As a middle path between deregulation and regulation, regularization could
produce better health, safety, and security outcomes for dwellers in informal
housing. An example of regularization is Larson’s proposal to regularize colonias
settlements in Texas.277 Larson recounts the experiences of colonia settlers who
were caught between the Texas legislature's well-intended efforts to standardize
informal land and housing conditions and the cost of complying with those
standards, which according to the colonia residents and low-income housing
activists presented the choice between having a decent home or no home.278 To
ameliorate this situation, Larson proposes “a progressive realization” of the
standards, adopting the notion from international human rights policies and
practices and marrying market and regulatory strategies.279
Another example of regularization is Professor Kreiczer-Levy's proposal to
confer the right to adult children to be consulted when their parents terminate their
joint living arrangement.280 She draws on the reliance theory of property within a
broader understanding of property as social relations281 to argue that adult children
living with a parent have legitimate expectations that must be recognized by
property law. 282 Property law doctrines often protect reasonable, actual
expectations that are based on informal arrangements rather than formal ones.283
Thus, a solution for informal tenants could be to impose duties on owners to
provide adequate notice when they evict informal tenants and to provide safe
facilities and amenities.
Courts can build on existing law and jurisprudence to mitigate health, safety,
and security problems facing informal housing tenants. As in State v. Shack, which
275. Rosario, 2018 WL 2209487, at *1–3.
276. See John Whitlow, Community Law Clinics in the Neoliberal City: Assessing Cuny's Tenant
Law and Organizing Project, 20 CUNY L. REV. 351, 363–69 (2017); Stefan H. Krieger, A Clash of
Cultures: Immigration and Housing Code Enforcement on Long Island, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1227, 1229
– 38 (2008).
277. Jane E. Larson, Negotiating Informality Within Formality: Land and Housing in the Texas
Colonias, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 140–57
(César A. Rodríguez Garavito & Boaventura de Sousa Santos eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
278. Id. at 154.
279. Larson’s proposals include regularizing land title held under contract for deed into mortgages,
making credit available at market rates to low-income households for land purchase, home construction,
and home improvement, adopting policies supporting self-help housing and abandoning current “nogrowth” policies directed at colonias, enacting minimal but appropriate land use regulations that apply both
to new and existing housing in the colonias, and mandating extension of municipal water and sewer service
to high-density population areas in unincorporated areas outside of city limits. Jane E. Larson, Free Market
Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L. J. 179, 238–58 (1995). Objections to these proposals include the
view that a legalized two disparate categories – one legal standard with a lessor set of health and safety
safeguards for the poor, immigrant, or racial minority informals and another standard with adequate
housing requirements – would legitimize inequality and the stereotypical “othering.” See Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo’s Twelfth Chronicle: The Problem of the Shanty, 85 GEO L. J. 667, 677, 688 (1997). For review
and responses to these objections, see Larson, supra note 63.
280. Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 27, at 129–130.
281 . See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOX OF PROPERTY 133–39 (Yale
Univ. Press 2000) (hereinafter ENTITLEMENT); Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 27, at 159
282. Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 27, at 129–130.
283. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PERSUASION: GETTING TO THE OTHER SIDE 107–110 (Carolina
Acad. Press 2019).
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held that farmworkers have the right to be visited by health and legal services
providers, even if the dwelling arrangement does not fall under the standard
tenancy,284 courts could steer away from considering ‘tenant’ status as a function
of exclusive control of premises and begin enforcing the fundamental rights and
interests of informal tenants without affording them the standard tenant status.
Such a shift could protect immigrants in shared residence against arbitrary
evictions or other precarity associated with informal dwelling arrangements.
When people’s permanent residence is at stake, rather than a transient
accommodation such as a hotel or lodging, protecting their rights in informal
housing is essential. As the COVID-19 pandemic has made clear, while students
and guests could leave for their homes when universities and hotels shut down
their premises, immigrants renting living rooms and basements have been left at
the mercy of their landlords/hosts without any pandemic-related “tenant”
protection programs to assist them.285 Similarly, an immigrant sharing a room with
a tenant in public housing has no legal protection. Other than charities that reach
out to immigrant communities, there are no official programs that address tenants
living in informal dwellings without formal tenant status.286
To properly protect the rights and interests of renters in informal dwellings,
courts could give less weight to the requirement of "exclusive possession" in
characterizing a tenancy as a landlord-tenant relationship. They could respond to
the harsh realities of sharing a home in substandard conditions by shifting the
attention away from the physicality of the premises to a relational view of tenant
rights.287 The law should value rent in residential tenancies according to whether
the competing interest is a home, which is a basic human need, or a license that
can be for leisure, convenience, or other transient use. If the law were to confer the
right not to be arbitrarily evicted on a new immigrant renting a room from a tenant
in public housing or in an illegally constructed basement of a single-family
homeowner, she could have adequate security to work and transition into the
economy and society. Such protection would be consistent with the idea of “home”
as an interest that is more than capital and investment.288
A. The Problem of “Unintended Consequence”
Extending tenant rights to include tenants living in an informal rental
arrangement raises some problems. First, conferring tenant status in informal
284. Shack, 277 A.2d at 374.
285. 50 State Statutory Surveys: COVID-19, LANDLORD/TENANT EVICTIONS, THOMPSON REUTERS
(Mar. 8 2021); Ron Lieber, The New Eviction Moratorium: What You Need to Know, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/your-money/eviction-moratorium-covid.html; Dougherty,
supra note 20.
286. See Zoe Greenberg, ‘People Are Falling Through the Cracks’: Many with Informal Housing Are
Blocked From Mass. Rental Aid Programs, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 26, 2021, 4:56 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/02/26/metro/they-need-help-paying-rent-they-cant-prove-theyrerenters/; Alana Semuels, Renters Are Being Forced From Their Homes Despite Eviction Moratoriums
Meant to Protect Them, TIME (Apr. 15, 2020, 2:47 PM), https://time.com/5820634/evictions-coronavirus/.
287. For relational view of property, see SINGER, supra note 281.
288. Lorna Fox O’Mahony & James A. Sweeney, The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and
Dispossession, in LAW, PROPERTY AND SOCIETY 1–12 (Loran Fox O’Mahony & James A. Sweeney eds.,
Ashgate Publ’g Ltd. 2011).
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housing arrangements could discourage people who rent out places to new
immigrants. The renter of a one-bedroom apartment hosting an immigrant in her
living room for payment might be reluctant to enter such an arrangement if she had
to provide adequate utilities or could not terminate the arrangement at will. A
homeowner in a single-family occupancy neighborhood who relied on rent
collected from immigrants living in the basement might increase the rent or
hesitate to enter the arrangement in the first place.
A more feasible alternative to protect renters in informal housing and gradually
regularize substandard housing would be to give the occupants the right to claim
damages from the landlord when the rent is high relative to the condition of the
premises. By allowing a renter in an informal housing arrangement to recover
damages for rents paid in excess of the fair market value of the property, courts
could help to palliate the injustice of rent extraction in the informal housing and
inhibit owners from renting out substandard and dangerous accommodations and
overcharging new immigrants.289 Under existing law, tenants in premises violating
housing codes and standards can seek remedies based on the doctrine of illegality
or warranty of habitability.290 While warranty of habitability claims apply, where
there is a tenant-landlord relationship but the premises substantially flout building,
health, and safety standards, some courts have applied the doctrine of illegality to
such situations on the ground that “no landlord-tenant relationship can exist where
there is an illegal apartment.” 291 Numerous courts have rendered a residential
rental agreement “illegal and unenforceable” when the property violated a building
code requiring a valid rental permit.292 When courts apply the doctrine of illegality
to rental premises violating housing codes, the renter can withhold rent and claim
damages upon terminating the tenancy.293 But she cannot recover the entire rent if
she had a constructive notice of the illegality,294 as the landlord is entitled to a
reasonable amount based on the specific circumstances of the case. The court in
King v. Moorehead reasoned that:
We prefer to base our decision openly on the hard reality that if,
under existing conditions, landlords were deprived of all rents
because of noncompliance with housing codes there would be far
fewer low-income housing units available—landlords would find
it to their economic advantage to abandon their properties rather
than spend their separate resources to restore them to
habitability.295

289. Duncan Kennedy, Law Distributes II: 1 Housing and Credit in Poor Black Neighborhoods 2
(Mar. 18, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
290. See King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 72–79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
291. Acquino v. Ballester, 953 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2012).
292. See Acquino, 953 N.Y.S.2d at 820; Ader v. Guzman, 135 A.D.3d 671, 674 (N.Y. App. Div.
2016).
293. Guzman, 135 A.D.3d at 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (the court reasoned that “it would be against
public policy to permit [the landlord] to retain [the tenants'] rental payments and to profit from his
wrongdoing,” and there was no indication that tenants “were raising the argument of illegality for personal
gain.").
294. Acquino, 953 N.Y.S.2d at 821-822.
295. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d at 79.
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Adjusting the doctrine of illegality, courts could protect immigrants paying
rent that greatly exceeded what the condition of the premises would justify by
allowing them to recover the excess amount if the accommodation was illegal and
the immigrant was unaware of the illegality of the premises.296 This logic could
apply whether the immigrant was living in an illegally converted unit, unventilated
basement, or the living room of another renter. Renters in an illegal apartment
would recover, for example, a proportional amount of the rent paid for inadequate
water and electricity services against landlords who denied these services to save
on their utility bills.
One concern raised by this suggestion is that landlords would exit the informal
market if renters could claim damages. Awarding damages to an informal tenant
who has paid high rent for an inhabitable basement could, in effect, amount to post
facto judicial rent control, raising questions about the chilling effect of such control
on the supply and other standard economic analysis objections that beleaguered
rent control laws. 297 This remedy, however, would be more akin to redressing
unjust or unlawful enrichment than to rent control.298 A judicial regulation of rent
exploitation would be unlikely to produce a significant disincentive for landlords
in informal market settings. Just as the court reasoned in Moorehead with respect
to tenants in a standard tenant-landlord relationship, 299 courts could allow
landlords in an informal rental arrangement to retain a reasonable share of the rent.
After all, under existing local housing codes, regulators can fine such landlords for
housing code violations, though they are often unable or reluctant to do so. Giving
informal tenants the right to claim damages is unlikely to disincentivize landlords
more than the existence of local housing codes, but such a right could inhibit the
exploitative extraction of rent from informal tenants.
Another concern is that immigrants and other renters have minimal access to
courts and legal resources. Thus, granting them legal remedies for exploitative rent
296. If the renter has knowledge of illegality of the premises, courts applying the doctrine of illegal
contract treat the tenant as culpable. Acquino, 953 N.Y.S.2d at 821. The court explained the policies of not
enforcing residential rental agreements of noncompliant building, the courts stated, with the New York
City Administrative Codes “placing substantial financial penalties on persons engaged in violating the
building code, why would it be permissible to reward a landlord by letting him collect rent on an illegal
apartment? Because under that scenario, a landlord could obtain a money judgment and either have that
judgment enforced through the legal process allowing him to collect rent on an apartment existing in
violation of the law or, if the tenant paid the rent due, that tenant could remain in possession of an apartment
which by definition is not in compliance with the building code. The court would be participating in the
continuance of the illegal and by definition unsafe occupancy. That cannot be the law. To make sense the
law has to be that the tenant must vacate the illegal unit as soon as possible, immediately if a vacate order
is issued, and the landlord is prohibited from collecting any rent. Otherwise, there is no reason for anyone
to correct the illegal conditions.” Id.
297. Major economic analysis objections against rent control include the view that rent control chills
the construction of housing and reduces the long-term supply of existing low-income housing by inducing
landlords to abandon their units, convert rental units to more lucrative uses, or maintain their properties
inadequately. Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing Market, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1835, 1844 (1988). For a list of objections against rent control, see William A. Fischel, Panel
Discussion: Redistribution and Regulation of Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 767, 767-801 (1983).
298. See Developments in the Law: Unjust Enrichment, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2020); The
Intellectual History of Unjust Enrichment, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2077 (2020); Elise Bant et al., The Evolution
of Unjust Enrichment Law: Theory and Practice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND
RESTITUTION, 2, 2–27 (Elise Bant et al. eds., 2020).
299. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d at 72–79.
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for informal tenancies could have limited social significance even if the courts
were to extend tenant rights. This is a form of the classic problem of the gap
between rights as legal promises and rights as practical realities. Nonetheless, if
renters in illegal housing could recover the portion of their rent paid in excess of
the fair value of the premises, charities and advocacy organizations that provide
legal services for immigrants and low-income households could extend support. In
addition, the potential social force of a rule that protected informal tenants could
potentially spur the bargaining power of informal tenants and deter landlords from
charging new immigrants exorbitant rent for substandard living conditions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Tenant rights law evaluates the landlord's interest in rent according to whether
the competing interest is a tenant's interest in a home or a transient living
arrangement, such as for leisure and other uses. Residential tenants enjoy legal
warranties of habitability and judicial protections against evictions, whereas
licensees can be removed by owners entitled to use self-help. The condition of a
new immigrant living in an informal arrangement is not transient. However
informal and shared her dwelling place may be, it is her home where she cooks,
eats, sleeps, gets her mail, and keeps her belongings. Unlike the hotel guest, lodger,
or transient roomer, she is unlikely to have a home somewhere else. Yet, according
to property law's conception of the tenant with rights and remedies, her legal status
is tenuous, akin to a licensee or lodger with contractual rights and remedies rather
than property rights. This legal disharmony traps immigrants in the inequities and
fault lines of the low-income housing market, undermining their potential to work
and become full-fledged members of American society. Renters in informal
housing are factually tenants; hence they need to have some basic tenant rights by
law. If courts would attenuate the primacy accorded to exclusive possession in
characterizing a tenancy, they could mitigate the most deleterious conditions of
informal housing. This Article has offered concrete suggestions toward that goal.

